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STEPS TOWARD DYNAMIC EXTERNALISM

TESIS DOCTORAL

PRESENTADO POR

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General abstract

Putnam's semantic externalism and Burge's anti-individualism are influential approaches to meanings and contents in the philosophy of mind and language. They maintain that groups of experts unidirectionally establish meanings and concepts. Deferer and deferee perspectives have yielded further developments in that externalist metasemantics. However, those advancements have been established from a synchronic and static view of them. In this way, our research initially focuses on aspects of the deferer perspective and how it can be directed toward different language sources. Then, we state that in technical meanings and concepts, deference is mainly directed to knowledge fields and is multiple-way directed to them and particulars. For kind term uses that cross technical and lexical meaning, we state that deference could be multiple different-way directed and compose synthetic meanings and concepts. After that, based on Cappelen's externalist conceptual engineering view on the metasemantic base, we propose taking the deferee perspective as a metasemantic base but emphasizing a diachronic perspective in which meanings and concepts can change to establish some steps toward a dynamic view of externalism. Though our research proposes elements that help view externalism from a dynamic perspective from deferers and deferees, it remains an upcoming approach that consistently links both parts.

Keywords: Knowledge field, multiple-way directed deference, synthetic meanings/concepts, stand-by proposals.

General introduction

This document is composed of three chapters structured as papers. Though they are in some way heterogeneous in the way the topics are addressed, there is a linear structure in which they are exposed. It takes the relation between two main aspects composing the structure of externalism of mind and language, i.e., how deferers and deferees relate. In addition, they elaborate on the dynamic ways they relate to each other. The first two chapters are based on the perspective of deferers, while the last is based mainly on the perspective of the deferees. However, the dynamic ways both views relate must be elaborated on in future developments.

Chapter 1 discusses Putnam's (1975) and Burge's (1979) approaches to meanings and mental contents and offers some interpretations of their various accounts to show how meanings of kind terms and mental contents are shared through experts and non-experts and involved relations. It starts from Putnam's proposal on two different accounts explaining how meanings are constituted: the indexicality of natural kind terms and social relations in a linguistic community structured by a division of linguistic labor. Then, we continue with Burge's anti-individualism, where extensional constraints within linguistic communities are said to determine concurrent representational mental contents to conventional kind uses (while deference has a secondary role in it).

Both approaches and adherents assume five fundamental issues which set them as a unified view or doctrine in mind and language: one-directionalism, exclusivism, univocalism, one-direction deferentialism (for semantic externalism approaches), situational domains of concepts (for anti-individualist approaches), and non-expert univocalism. This chapter aims to develop a proposal that considers a source of meanings/concepts but different deferential targets for technical kind terms' users and users-deferers, an account that we subscribe to what we label *multiple-directed deferential attitudes*. However, an objective that follows it is to provide a basis for an account of a *multiple-different-way direction deferentialism*.

Also, the chapter examines the ideas that give rise to one-directionalism, such as Putnam's semantic externalism, Burge's anti-individualism, Recanati's approach to deferential concepts,

Woodfield's approach to deliberate deference, and a modified approach to Recanati's deference and Woodfield's deliberated deference. Finally, it identifies two types of deferential attitudes: one which targets knowledge fields and one that targets particulars subscribed to them.

Chapter 2 states that externalist approaches such as Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), and Stojanovic et al. (2005) have not discussed in depth the idea of 'the linguistic community.' Therefore, the chapter proposes a more pluralist externalist approach that re-sets the idea of 'the linguistic community' and deals with the distinction between linguistic deference and epistemic deference, the distinction between deference by default and deliberate deference for linguistic deference, and the view on incomplete mastery of concepts as an independent issue of both types of deference. It also discusses the difficulties of their taxonomy of deference, their view on partial understanding, and orthogonality between partial understanding and deference. Finally, it discusses different language sources' role in deferers' meanings/concepts and suggests how they can be linked.

Chapter 3 focuses on Cappelen's conceptual engineering tenets and some limitations and proposes covering some of them. Cappelen (2018) bases his theory of conceptual engineering on semantic externalism and social externalism. Although he highlights the drawbacks of those solutions as a means of accounting conceptual change, simultaneous dynamic externalism is assumed to play a crucial part. However, additional information is required regarding how it occurs and how conceptual engineering relates to and differs from it. Finally, the chapter elaborates on components for developing dynamic externalism based on experts and suggests ways to distinguish and relate dynamic externalism from conceptual engineering.

1. A step toward multiple-different-way-directed deference: on Semantic Externalism's and Anti-individualism's tenets on deference.

Abstract:

Deference has a core role in externalist doctrines of mind and meaning. In Putnam (1975), the idea of division of linguistic labor is founded on it; however, for Burge (1979), it is overlooked and has a secondary role. Advancements along similar lines proposed by Recanati (1997, 2000A) and Woodfield (2000) give it a predominant role in meaning and contents. We consider all these approaches members of a doctrine in mind and language called *one-direction distribution of meanings/contents* and expose five main assumptions that characterize it. Against it and a version of this doctrine that emphasizes deferential processes, which we call *one-direction deferentialism*, we state that they overlook the fact that different meaning sources of a kind term's use and concomitant concepts can be available for technical kind terms' users and users-deferers. By adhering to Recanati's approach to indexicality of concepts and kind terms and Woodfield's deference to norms of correct use, we propose an account of technical kind terms' use (with or without deference), whose uses are linked through indexicality to communities (knowledge fields) instead of particulars and mere norms. For technical kind term users-deferers, we differentiate a main from a subsidiary character target for concepts and kind terms' use with deference. We propose representing them with a modified Recanati's deferential operator and using them simultaneously when necessary. Consequently, we develop an account in which technical kind terms' uses (with or without deference) involve *multiple-directed deferential attitudes*. Though it still accounts for deference with exclusive sources of concepts and kind terms, it poses a basis for developing a *multiple-different-way direction deferentialist* account, a step towards an externalist account on different sources for technical kind term uses (with or without deference), a plural externalist approach on meanings and concepts.

Keywords: externalism, anti-individualism, indexicals, character, deference, Recanati's deferential operator.

Conceptual framework keywords: situational domains of concepts, situational domains of kind term's indexicality, one-direction distribution of meanings/content, one-direction deferentialism,

multiple-one-way-direction deferentialism, multiple-different-way-direction deferentialism, knowledge field, technical kind terms.

Introduction:

Putnam's (1975) semantic externalism and Burge's anti-individualism (1979) approaches to meanings and mental contents, respectively, though similar, suggest different accounts for establishing how meanings of kind terms and mental contents are shared through experts and non-experts and involved relations. On the one hand, Putnam proposes two different accounts for explaining how the meanings of kind terms are constituted. The first one appeals to the indexicality of natural kind terms, an issue that links natural kind terms' uses with their extensions. The second one appeals to social relations in a linguistic community structured by a division of linguistic labor, where the cooperation of the more expert users of kind terms supplies deference of the lesser expert users of kind terms.

On the other hand, Burge gives a secondary role to deference and does not consider the division of linguistic labor for explaining the contents of concomitant mental representations to conventional kind term uses. On the contrary, he limits his approach to stressing that extensional constraints within linguistic communities determine concurrent representational mental contents to conventional kind uses, an issue we call *the situational domain of concepts*. Both approaches and approaches that adhere to them are said to assume five fundamental issues which set them as a unified view or doctrine in mind and language: (1) one-directionalism, (2) exclusivism, (3) univocalism, (4) one-direction deferentialism (only for semantic externalism and adherents), (5) situational domains of concepts (only for anti-individualism and adherents), and (6) non-experts' meanings of kind terms and concepts are univocal.

We label approaches based on 1-6 as *one-direction distribution of meanings/contents*. This expresses what we mean in 1 but captures the general idea. Also, we label versions of it emphasizing deferential processes as *one-direction deferentialism*. This overall doctrine does not consider that different meaning sources of a kind term use (and of its concomitant concept) can be available. This chapter aims to develop a proposal that considers a source of meanings/concepts

but different deferential targets for technical kind terms' users and users-deferers, an account that we subscribe to what we label *multiple-directed deferential attitudes*. However, an objective that follows it is to provide a basis for an account of a *multiple-different-way direction deferentialism*.

That said, in 1.1. the chapter addresses Putnam's (1975) semantic externalism. In it, we expose the ideas that give rise to what we call *one-direction deferentialism*: the role that plays the extension of natural kind terms in meanings through the division of linguistic labor from the experts to the non-experts.¹ In 1.2., we expose Burge's (1979, 2006) anti-individualism by emphasizing *the situational domains of concepts*. Also, there are highlighted differences and similarities between Putnam's semantic externalism and Burge's anti-individualism. We also stress the limitations of Burge's approach and suggest a way out of them. In the end, we state in what way both approaches are one-direction deferentialists. In 1.3., we address Recanati's (1997, 2000A) approach to deferential concepts and his deferential operator and propose to consider indexicality for conventional kind terms and establish its relation to one-direction deferentialism. Additionally, in 1.4., we expose Woodfield's approach to deliberate deference, where he criticizes Recanati's approach and proposes to solve them.

In 1.5., we take elements from Recanati's approach to propose an account of the indexicality of conventional kind terms and a modified version of what he calls deferential, basic, and scientific concepts. Also, we offer a modified approach to Woodfield's deliberated deference, where current norms of correct use are circumscribed by what we call *knowledge fields* and targeted by deferers. In this vein, two types of deferential attitudes are identified, one which targets knowledge fields and another targeting particulars that are subscribed or somehow subscribed to the knowledge field.

In 1.6., we propose a modified version of Recanati's deferential operator that is based on our proposal of changing the target of character for deferers and propose to use Recanati's deferential

¹ For a critique on the use of 'expert' in deference, see Sawyer (2021). We agree with Sawyer that 'expert' is not the best label for any deferee. However, insofar as our discussion is centered on specific cases of deference, we use the term mainly in two ways: firstly, in the sense that deferers recognize some who master better a kind term (and possess a more elaborated concept) and, secondly, in the sense that in technical kind terms uses there are specialists in knowledge fields to whom must defer.

operator for representing subordinated deferential attitudes to the main one, i.e., those deferring to particulars which are subscribed or somehow subscribed to a knowledge field. Also, since deferential operations to individual experts involve simultaneous deferential operations, we distinguish between multiple-one-way-directed deferential attitudes and multiple-different-way-directed deferential attitudes. Finally, in 1.7. we sketch how characters of kind terms are structured, based mainly on introductions and recognitional capacities of kind terms users and users-deferers. Finally, we taxonomize misapplications of character targets stating in which ways they can be misapplied, and label all of them as cases of an *incomplete mastering of the character* of kind terms.

1.1. Putnam's semantic externalism

According to Putnam (1975), the meaning of a kind term is determined by its extension, i.e., the set of things to which a term applies. Putnam is opposed to doctrines stating that intensions in the sense of notions (as subjective psychological views) determine the meanings of terms and to the idea that the intension of meaning determines its extension.

Putnam formulates his famous twin earth thought experiment to show that extension determines meanings. The thought experiment considers two indistinguishable scenarios, in this case, twin earth, where everything looks identical, even societies with their respective cultures, languages, and people. The only difference is that water in each scenario has a different chemical composition. Thus, back in the time before the development of chemistry, two doppelgangers of each scenario have the same beliefs about 'water,' the same notions of it, and identical psychological experiences when considering water. However, the lesson is that their psychological states do not determine their respective extensions.

Consequently, the first factor contributing to determining the extension of a natural kind term is the internal structure of natural kinds surrounding us. According to Putnam, such structure contributes to determining the extension of a natural kind term use through its indexation with a *de re* "this" or "that" and from there to anything that carries an equivalence relation in the actual world. Accordingly, natural kind terms have an indexical component in that "x natural kind term" is any other stuff that carries an equivalent relation to x natural kind to which we relate here.

The second factor contributing to determining the extension of a kind term is the linguistic community considered as a collective linguistic body. According to Putnam, many natural kind terms are not easily identifiable, but some people deal with them according to the fields to which they concur or pertain. Thus, when any flaw happens in recognizing natural kinds, people usually rely on the judgment of experts in the matter. According to Putnam, the knowledge of subsets of people with specific labors, reflected in their speeches, is inherited by the collective linguistic body provided that non-expert people rely on them, allowing for the establishment of social meanings of words. Structured cooperation between non-experts' users that defer to experts' users and experts who help them forms a division of linguistic labor. In this sense, those who learn how to identify extensions of natural kind terms (the collective linguistic body's sociolinguistic state) fix the term's extension.

However, the internal structure of natural kind terms is not always a criterion for determining the extension of a term. In some cases, other features are decisive for determining it, for instance, social considerations and concerns or how the environment is set. In this way, a society can determine the extension of a term according to superficial features of heterogeneous things or by convention.

1.2. Burge's anti-individualism and the division of linguistic labor

Burge's (1979) anti-individualism, as its name indicates, is an answer to approaches that consider that individuals own the constitutive roles of their mental kinds. To point out that this is not the case, Burge considers mental kinds involved in conceptions for kind terms. Such mental kinds show in Burge's approach relations to kind terms determinations. However, he stresses that some of such determinations involve conventional aspects, enclosing social elements in their constitution. Such type of kind terms is the ones that he is interested in considering.

Let us begin with the tenets of the approach. Burge mentions that his account for the identification of contents of mental kinds is restricted by the theoretical assumption that "differences in the extension—the actual denotation, referent, or application—of counterpart expressions in that-

clauses will be semantically represented, and will, in our terms, make for differences in content” (Burge 1979, p. 75). The case is to show how counterpart expressions are extensional equivalent in a situation or extensional non-equivalent between situations by considering circumstances outside a speaker. What guarantees the sameness of counterpart expressions' content is, then, an extension that circumscribes a situation. So, differences in extensions between situations involve differences in counterpart expressions' contents.² But, beyond such aspects for the identification of contents, what Burge wants to emphasize the most is that “theoretical restrictions on the notion of content are inherited by the notion of notion” (Burge 1979, p. 75). Burge uses ‘notion’ to refer to components or elements of content, so the theoretical restriction for contents based on considering the role that different extensions play in different situations implies differences in the involved notions.³

Let us look at how to consider counterpart expressions by considering Burge’s theoretical assumption, i.e., set up on extensional differences. Take, for example, counterpart expressions ‘whiskey’ and ‘water of life.’ There are circumstances in which extensional issues can influence attributions of contents, i.e., usual location and major presence of one spirit than the other for attributing contents of what people mean. So, the way contexts of attribution are set up can be determinant to attribute what people mean when they use mentioned counterpart expressions. However, difficulties can arise in attributing contents when people use such expressions in many contexts due to:

- (1) People’s location is not always determinant for attributing what they mean, since with ‘whiskey’ people may indistinctly intend to mean Irish or American spirit, and with ‘water of life’ people may intend to mean whisky (scotch), in addition to any of the above two.
- (2) If there is any influence of the extensional differences between Irish and American whiskey of what people mean by ‘whiskey,’ these are not always determinable.

² Here, content is considered a type-attitude type-content, covering token-contents for some counterpart expressions.

³ A consequence is that the theoretical restriction on the notion of content based on the consideration of the role different extensions play in different situations implies a difference in the notion of notion.

Considering difficulties for determining the extensions of kind terms uses in situations where different extensions for a kind term use are at stake, Burge requires content attribution situations to be restrained of multiple extensional sources for a particular use of a kind term to safeguard that it is used in an exclusive and univocal way. The strategy is then to insulate counterpart expressions uses through the insulation of their extension for granting their synonymy and attributions of the same type-contents and the same type-notions for any of them. Once insulation of such different situations is the case, there are set up conditions for stating accurately that in some intra-situational ways, counterpart expressions involve attributions of the same type-contents and type-notions through an extensional constrain, while in familiar but inter-situational ways counterpart expressions involve attributions of different type-contents and type-notions through differentiated extensional constraints.

However, one main aim of the approach is to set anti-individualism. Thus, Burge formulates his argument by setting up bordering individualist aspects, i.e., inter-situational twin aspects with twin individuals (doppelgängers) in each one, to show with elements and circumstances considered by individualists as granters of their approach that with them individualism does not uphold.⁴

Thus, the argument for anti-individualism is mainly exposed through a thought experiment that, as said, describes two twin situations with many indistinguishable aspects, such as the physical constitution of individuals, proximal history relations, and surrounding settings. It asks us to imagine an actual situation and a counterfactual situation where the individuals, let's call them Omar and twin Omar, live respectively, and where such scenarios are so similar that the physical relations both have had have occurred in such a way that they are physical, molecule by molecule, identical. Moreover, both individuals develop dispositions about expressions in which 'arthritis' occur, acquire it from conversation or reading, and both happen to undergo physical pain in their ankles and their thighs and believe that they have arthritis in their ankles and thighs. Both go to the physician, and while Omar discovers his false belief, twin Omar reinforces his belief. The conclusion is that in both cases, *even before the medical consultation*, Omar and his twin have different contents containing different notions of 'arthritis.'

⁴ Some philosophers stress that in such circumstances, individualism upholds by differentiating two different types of content, i.e., broad and narrow content. What is different in doppelgängers' content is broad content, while what they share in them is said to be narrow content. For a discussion on these issues, see Brown (2016).

For Burge, differences in their contents lie in:

(A) Differences in social circumstances.

In particular due to:

(B) Differences in expert concepts.

Insofar as expert concepts for kind term ‘arthritis’ are considered as being conceived in each case by being set up by criteria which encompass elements out of a single natural kind conformation and determining them in a somehow conventional way, expert concepts differences imply:

(C) Extensional differences for ‘arthritis’ in both situations.

According to (A), social factors with their differentiated elements, in particular, due to (B), i.e., expert communities with differentiated concepts, *supply the elements for attributing different mental kinds (type-notions)*, in virtue of (C), i.e., that extensions are expertly determined. However, one thing is that different situations constrain the way one attributes mental contents through their involved notions, and another is that other fixations within different situations involve different mental kinds for the non-experts. This last issue is an interpretation made by Burge from the thought experiment.

The last idea can be viewed by considering what we call *situational domains of concepts*.⁵ The situational domains of concepts can be regarded as a position stating that at least two views behind the use of a kind term are engaged solely due to the location and community they share. Usually, one of them is said to be either the true version of it, a more approximate true scheme of it⁶, or the more complete version of it, while the other is said to be the less approximate true scheme of it or the less complete version of it. Such a position is illustrated by the experts and the non-expert

⁵ Note that here we are applying ‘concept’ to experts’ mental kinds (notions) linked to conventional kind terms.

⁶ For an elaborated view on the idea of concept see Burge (1993).

protagonists in Burge's anti-individualist scenarios. However, even though Burge does not consider the division of linguistic labor for his account of mental contents and appeal to situated extensional constraints of concepts, his approach gives way to a mitigated version of it since the idea of incomplete conceptions in the thought experiment does not arise spontaneously. Also, the protagonists are conceived as deferers, two crucial elements in a division of linguistic labor.

Interesting to mention that in Burge's formulation of the thought experiment, the protagonists are said to interact with linguistic expressions and develop dispositions concerning words in which 'arthritis' occurs and is acquired from conversation or reading. Even in his postscript (Burge, 2006), causal explanations of word acquisition are emphasized in the beginning. In the end, causal relations to other people for conventional kind terms acquisition are stressed. However, these elements are not considered primordial and have a secondary role in his characterization of mental kinds.

Thus, two important similarities between Putnam's (1975) semantic externalism and Burge's anti-individualism are *the role that plays extensions in determining meanings and concepts* and their emphasis on kind term users' hierarchies. However, there are noticeable differences. Firstly, Putnam is interested in meaning, while Burge (1979) is interested in mental contents and involved notions. Secondly, Putnam's semantic externalism focuses mainly on natural kind terms, while Burge's anti-individualism concentrates primarily on conventional kind terms, i.e., kind terms that somehow contain conventional aspects. Thirdly, while Putnam considers that extensions determine meanings and, therefore, that they ain't in the head, Burge considers that extensions determine mental contents and involved notions but contemplates that what people have in the head (mental kinds/notions) are about the extensions to which they refer (this is another way of stating the situational domain of concepts). Fourthly, while for Putnam, natural kind terms possess an indexical component that links their use to surrounding extensions (Cf. Putnam, 1975 p. 152), for Burge are neighboring social aspects the ones which guarantee which contents and involved notions are people considering when are using kind terms (Cf. Burge, 1979 pp. 114-116). For Burge, the thought experiment can be settled without considering *de re* attitudes; thus, in addition to his consideration that indexicality is not working in kind terms, 'indexical' attitudes are not required for its establishment.

And finally, fifthly, Putnam's semantic externalism extensions have an additional and complementary way to be fixed to their natural fixation (so they can be two-way fixed), i.e., expert groups socially fix them. In this last way of fixing extensions, the fixations are said to be distributed across the collective linguistic body through a division of linguistic labor that guarantees exclusiveness and univocity of uses for natural kind terms through it. Such division is structured considering at least the following three issues: (a) natural/conventional kind terms used by experts⁷ (b) a structured relation within the collective body in which a distributed linguistic labor of such terms begins from the more expert passing through the lesser experts to the least non-experts, and (c) implicit cooperation of experts and dependency reliance on them (deference) by the non-experts.

For Putnam, the indexical component is the bond to natural kinds, which determines natural kind terms' meanings for all society, including experts. However, due to the way experts use kind terms is supposed to be linked to the way surroundings are structured and composed, and a subsequent meaning sharing through the division of linguistic labor's chain is said to guarantee meanings for the lesser experts and non-experts, expert's kind terms use turns out also to determine their kind terms use/meanings. Consequently, semantic externalism maintains that the less experts and non-experts use kind terms in the way leading experts do. Similarly, for Burge, how experts convene on concepts constrains how other members of society conceive them. But, remarkably different than semantic externalism, as said above, causal interactions through a division of linguistic labor are not considered a condition for attributing non-expert contents and notions. For anti-individualism, experts' fixations of kind terms are regarded as sufficient for attributing what other members of society conceive when using them. Subsequently, leading experts determine non-expert members' contents and notions (this is another way of formulating a situational domain of concepts).

On the other hand, semantic externalism and anti-individualism approaches share some structural elements in their methods. For their argument to be compelling, both approaches set up twin scenarios with doppelgängers as their protagonists, where surroundings are superficially identical

⁷ Which implies, in the case of natural kind terms, the recognition by them of their ostentional relation to natural kinds.

and established in such a way that grant their physical identical body constitutions and twin perspectives, but where non-evident surrounding differences that they ignore are highlighted and involve substantial differences in meanings for semantic externalism and concepts/conceptions for anti-individualism.

The main reason for using twin scenarios with unknown surrounding differences is, in the case of semantic externalism, to undermine any remain of meaning solipsism, a view which states that from an individual's point of view alone, meanings can be grasped, i.e., that meaning extensions of natural kind terms are determined from meaning intensions that individuals have of them. In the case of anti-individualism, to undermine any remains of individualism (the view that states that mental contents and involved notions of an individual are obtained without considering relations to the environment, i.e., that individuals' physical constitution and behaviors alone constitute their mental contents and related notions). Therefore, both approaches are proposed against views on meaning and mental kinds, which overlook the importance of considering relations to the environment.

Additionally, semantic externalism and anti-individualism approaches share some tenets. While semantic externalism (when applying division of linguistic labor) conceives a picture where natural kind terms are used by leading experts in exclusive and univocal ways, passing from the more experts to the lesser experts of the collective linguistic body, anti-individualism considers a picture where conventional kind terms are used, and leading experts of the linguistic community conceive related concepts to them in exclusive and univocal ways. Hence, it states that there are extensional restrictions of expert uses and concepts which, according to the situational domain of a concept, not only determine that non-expert's uses and their related conceptions of them are the same but that they also undergo exclusive and univocal uses and conceptions.

Thus, for them, meaning/contents are shared through a linguistic community. We list five core assumptions they assume: (1) there is and must be a unique one-to-one relation between kinds (natural and conventional), kind terms (natural and conventional, respectively), and mental kinds (concepts of natural and conventional kinds, respectively); (2) there is or there must be an exclusive expert meaning and conceptual source; (3) Expert's exclusive kind term uses/meanings and

concepts are univocal, i.e., there is a single and unique kind term use and concept for a kind at hand by experts; (4) there is a single link between experts and non-experts which is achieved through deference and expert cooperation; (5) there is a single link between experts and non-experts which is guaranteed by extensional restrictions (situational domains of concepts); therefore, (6) there are, and must be, exclusive and univocal non-expert kind term uses/meanings and conceptions.

In this vein, *one-direction deferentialism* is the view that assumes that deferers have essentially one target deferee, *exclusivism* is the view that assumes that there is only one legitimate expert source for (technical) meanings and concepts, and *univocalism* is the view that assumes that experts conceive a unique, stable, and fulfilled meaning/concept. Now, considering that those assumptions imply that meaning/contents are unidirectionally shared, in the case of natural kinds from them passing through experts to the non-experts, and conventional kinds from the experts to the non-experts, we call those views which assume 1-6 as *one-direction distribution of meanings/contents*. For one-direction deferentialism to be the case, exclusivism and univocalism must work with it to grant non-experts exclusive and univocal uses and conceptions.

Also, it is important to be stressed that one-direction deferentialism *can also be seen* as the view that states that exclusive and univocal meanings/contents are shared through the collective linguistic body by one-directional deferential processes. Though, insofar as Burge's anti-individualism emphasizes extensional restrictions for content sharing through a linguistic community and does not emphasize deferential processes as the consolidators of contents through a linguistic community, one-direction deferentialism only plays in such consolidation a secondary role. On the contrary, insofar as Putnam's semantic externalism gives to deference the role of consolidating a shared meaning through the linguistic community, it can be characterized as a one-direction deferentialist approach.

On the other hand, Burge's situational concepts' domains face two fundamental problems. The first concerns situational domains of concepts where different conceptual sources share

fundamental elements of their truth scheme.⁸ In such cases, for guaranteeing non-experts' truth values and contents, one can ask, to which expert's source does the non-expert's conception (with a lesser true conceptual scheme) engage? The second has to do with the issue of not considering deference for granting sharing content, thus leaving open the question of excluding the possibility of conceptual drift (arising a new concept) because of non-deferential attitudes. Hence, the question remains of how the non-expert grasps incomplete versions of a socially situated concept without considering deference as a critical element.

Another question concerns generic situational aspects as opposed to native situational aspects. The former ones are those which can be identified as identical twin particularities between different situational domains, while the second ones are those to which truth values can be applied. Incomplete conceptions (intensions, narrow content) of twins in twin scenarios can be identified as generic situational particularities when differences related to their scenarios are identified. We stated above that Burge does not suitably anchor generic particularities to native ones in two circumstances. Now, we want to set different scenarios to obtain a similar conclusion. Consider, for example, two identical situational domains (or absolute twin scenarios) such as those conceived by Burge with 'arthritis' cases but where experts in both scenarios have the same concepts of arthritis. Can we still talk about native and generic particularities for non-expert conceptions before they talk to the physician? What happened to burgean sharing content argument based on concepts' situational domains in these scenarios?

Our answer to this question is that those scenarios bring the criteria to establish an alternate distinction between both particularities and give elements to make a different construal on Burge's approach, but with a similar conclusion than above. In these absolute twin scenarios, generic features can be established as those which englobe both situational domains and whose scope covers more than one element or situation, the reason why their status is abstract and dependent on descriptions. On the other hand, native features can be indexed whose scope is a particular element or situation. Now, consider that what sets a domain of a concept in Burge's approach is the similitude of a concept instead of its situation of occurrence, i.e., the idea that incomplete

⁸ For example, other experts' concepts that share part or all its extension but include other elements. Note that here we are applying 'concept' to expert's mental kinds linked to kind term uses involving conventional aspects.

versions of concepts are linked with complete or more complete versions of them according to their resemblance. Thus, although both scenarios fix arthritis in the same way and the concept's domain of arthritis covers both situations (facing at least the conceptual drift problem stressed above), there is still no noticeable actual link between concepts and non-complete versions. Differently, in these complete twin scenarios deference and its implicit indexicality establish a link between particulars, i.e., a conceiver and her native community, to the contents they have fixed. This new construal on Burge's concept domain shows that there is no visible step from general to native particularities, i.e., there are no visible linkages between users instantiating the complete and non-complete versions of a concept.

Considering Burge's approach to linking non-experts' concepts to expert concepts, we adhere to Putnam's account of the division of linguistic labor to make actual links between non-experts' meanings/conceptions to expert meanings/concepts. Burge, on his part (Cf. 2006, p. 152), highlights that Putnam (1975) considered erroneously that natural kind terms have an indexical component, backing the view that representational mental states are constant and shared for the actual and counterfactual individual in actual and counterfactual situations, even if the referents related with them in both situations differ. In such cases, for Burge, the earth individual's mental representation is about H₂O, while the twin earth individual's representation is XYZ. For Putnam, their intensions are the same, and their extensions differ, so they have different meanings and equal representations.

We state that the difference in meanings/concepts between both individuals lies in the relations that link kind term uses/concepts to kind terms' meanings/concepts in their environments. We identify two links between intensions/representations to their native issues being referenced. On the one hand, we recognize causal links; on the other, we identify indexical links. We consider that causal links are the initial elements that connect kind term users/conceptions to extensions and state that causal links with native elements/communities are what make operative indexical components in kind term uses/conceptions and deferential attitudes.⁹ Therefore, the intension (or representation) alone (for arising in a domain with extensional restrictions) does not determine the

⁹ We consider direct and indirect causal interaction to extensions. When no interaction with the extension but its identification through others happen, indirect interaction occurs.

extension of a natural kind term. Still, it plus a link made causally at the outset and then by an indexical component of a kind term or deferential attitude to its context of acquisition does. Therefore, our approach states that representational states of twin scenarios are different insofar as, by definition, they are about different extensions. Still, other than Burge maintains that what guarantees the difference is a form of indexicality working after causal interaction to the relevant term and extension.¹⁰

For the cases of indexicality related to kind terms uses/concepts,¹¹ it is important to differentiate *implicit indexicality* from *deferential indexicality*. Implicit indexicality in natural kind terms uses/conceptions is an aspect that becomes operative after causal relations with its extension has been established, in which case when they are used/conceived, map natural kinds.¹² Also, it can happen in conventional kind terms¹³, which also is an aspect added to their use after causal relations with their extensions have been established (where expert users and their criteria work as causal intermediates), in which case when used/conceived map those extensions which a group of experts has fixed.¹⁴ Differently, deferential indexicality is an aspect usually added to kind term uses/concepts after causal relations with expert users (and their concepts) have been established. In such cases, a kind term deferential use/concept maps those experts onto extensions they have fixed.

We label both types of indexicality as *situational domains of kind terms' indexicality*. Such domains help establish kind term users/concepts links to native situations.¹⁵ The difference between implicit indexicality and deferential indexicality of conventional kind terms lies in that

¹⁰ Kind terms uses involve concomitant concepts so that indexicality can be assigned altogether to uses of kind terms and involved concepts.

¹¹ Concepts, whether in a burgean approach which takes experts' mental kinds backing conventional kind terms uses, or in a Recanatian approach, if there is considered his notation on deferential, basic, and specialized concepts (according to section 1.5).

¹² See last paragraph in 1.5. and footnote 31.

¹³ We adhere to Sawyer's (2021) characterization of conventional concepts but consider that there are other kinds of conventional terms. According to her, conventional concepts are those whose direction of determination goes from mind-to-world. Still, for their establishment, a previous establishment of concepts whose direction of determination goes from world-to-mind is needed. These kinds of conventional concepts are those which we discuss in this chapter. However, many conventional concepts (such as those proposed in arts) are not based on previous concepts whose direction of determination goes from world-to-mind.

¹⁴ Below in 1.5. we label such groups as knowledge fields.

¹⁵ Also, to establish criteria for making linkages to non-native situations, as will be shown in chapter 2.

the former works as a structured element without deference (though for its establishment, deference was working), while the second one works deferentially. However, in both cases, the experts are mapped onto the extensions they have fixed.¹⁶

1.3. Recanati's deferential concepts

In line with Putnam (1975), Recanati's (1997, 2000A, 2000B) approach emphasizes deferential processes within a linguistic community to guarantee content sharing. Also, it proposes indexical concepts components as the elements that ensure content sharing through a linguistic community. In this vein, it considers that according to the grade of mastering of a kind term, the division of linguistic labor is structured by three types of users that instance three different types of concepts: deferential, basic, and scientific. In this respect, possessing any of the three types of concepts depends on the recognitional abilities of relevant environmental things to which kind term users are referring.

According to Donellan (1993), Recanati differences between basic and scientific concepts. The former are those concepts linked to kind terms uses, which help kind term users to recognize their extensions. The second are those concepts linked to kind term uses, which allow users to single out their paradigms. On the other hand, for his part, Recanati differentiates deferential concepts, i.e., those concepts linked to kind term use where their users lack extensional and paradigmatic recognitional abilities for them and which led them to refer to those users who possess their basic concepts or scientific concepts. Recanati also considers that kind term users with basic concepts defer to those who have scientific concepts when they want to determine natures scientifically, so he establishes two types of deference, the one that goes by default with deferential concepts and the one which can arise when a kind term user with a basic concept defers to a scientific user/conceiver of it.

¹⁶ See the last paragraph in 1.5. and footnote 31.

According to Recanati, for deferential uses of kind terms to be grounded, a deferee must master the relevant concept or defer to one who does. This is what Recanati (2000A, p. 452) calls the Groundedness thesis:

A deferential use is *grounded* only if someone at the other end of the deferential chain uses the expression in a non-deferential manner.

In this respect, scientific concepts, and basic concepts, on their behalf, are self-standing concepts; their possession responds to relevant recognitional abilities, while deferential concepts need other people to give them contextual access to the paradigms (Cf. Recanati 2000A, pp. 455-6). For Recanati, only basic concepts and deferential concepts enclose indexical components. In both cases, the context plays the role of fixing the extension, in the former through the underlying nature of the accessible paradigm and, in the second, via people possessing basic concepts and scientific concepts. Hence, a deferential concept is grounded in deference to someone who masters a basic concept or to an expert who masters a scientific concept.

Based on Kaplan's distinction between character and content for indexical terms, Recanati (Cf. Recanati 2000A, p. 455) states a similar structure for deferential and basic concepts. For both concepts, the character is conceived as a semantic rule which is implicitly followed by a kind term user with a related basic concept or deferential concept to which some elements of the environment are referred. In the first cases, what it is referred to are underlying natures of accessible paradigms.¹⁷ In contrast, in second cases, what it is referred to is a more competent user of the kind term, i.e., someone who possesses a related basic concept or a scientific concept. So, the character of a kind term/concept is a function that maps in the context in which the concept is acquired, a set of local paradigms onto its content or someone who masters a basic concept or a scientific

¹⁷ One may ask, what happens with conventional kind terms involving meanings/concepts (scientific concepts in Recanati's approach and expert concepts in Burge's.)? In such cases, considering Recanati's view on character, in line with the previous section, we propose to take conventional expert criteria of kind terms meanings/concepts as analogs to natures of natural kind terms meanings/concepts. Consequently, those conventional criteria (or part) act as the underlying aspects that determine extensions of the accessible paradigm for conventional kind term users with related deferential concepts. In this way, the deferential concept's character in conventional kind terms uses maps the relevant extension through those who have fixed it.

concept onto its content. In each case, what is identified/determined, in turn, helps in identifying/determining the extension of a concept.¹⁸

Recanati's account of concepts is limited to explaining the character of natural kind terms, so one may ask how the character works in deferential and basic uses of conventional kind terms. In such cases, considering Recanati's view on character for natural kind terms, where basic concepts character aims at underlying natures of the accessible paradigm, and deferential concept's character aims to those who link them to the relevant extension, we propose (in line with the previous section) to take conventional expert criteria of kind terms meanings/concepts as analogs to natures of natural kind terms meanings/concepts. Consequently, a community with conventional criteria (or part of them) acts as the underlying aspects that determine extensions of the accessible paradigm for conventional kind term users with related deferential concepts. In this way, the character of a deferential concept of conventional kind term users maps the relevant extension through those who have fixed it. On the other hand, his account of the indexicality of kind terms is limited to scientific and basic uses. Still, it does not involve cases where the extension of a kind term is not identifiable after any interaction with their use and reference, what we call implicit indexicality.

In Recanati's approach, deferential concepts' character leads non-experts' kind terms use of σ to experts' use of σ and the content they have fixed. He states that deferential concepts are constructed using the deferential operator $R_x()$, which yields a syntactically complex representation operator $R_x(\sigma)$ when introducing a public symbol σ . For its part, x is a competent user of σ ,¹⁹ and σ is a natural/conventional kind term. Examples of the deferential operator interpreted are $R_{doctor}(arthritis)$, $R_{chemist}(heavy\ water)$, $R_{linguist}(synecdoche)$, and so on. Note that according to Recanati's *Interpretation Principle*,²⁰ for deferers entertain deferential concepts, they must master their character.

¹⁸ Note that for basic concepts related to somehow conventional kind terms, like deferential concepts, character led to such properties through the experts that have established which properties their extensions happen to instantiate.

¹⁹ Who can be an individual or a community (See, Recanati 2000A, p. 458). In the same way as a deferee can be a group, a deferer can also be a group. For example, when several individuals share the same deferential attitude as in the congregation x defers to the pope. See Pettit & Schweikard (2006) for a group approach to deference. See Gilbert & Pilchman (2014) for a group approach to belief.

²⁰ "If a mental sentence is well-formed, it must possess a definite meaning –a character– even if it falls short of expressing a definite content" Recanati 2000A p. 461.

Note that in the same vein as Putnam and Burge, what guarantees the groundedness of deferential, basic, and scientific concepts, are exclusive and univocal fixations by experts. Thus, the idea of a division of linguistic labor plus a groundedness thesis both guarantee the same contents for related deferential concepts of natural and conventional kind term uses.²¹ Now, like Putnam and Burge, one-direction deferentialism manifests in what groundedness thesis means, i.e., the exclusive and univocal conceptual sources to which non-experts' conceptions are hopelessly linked, and their content guaranteed.

1.4. Woodfield's deliberate deference

Woodfield's approach to deference centers on criticizing Fodor's (1994, 1998) and Recanati's (1997) approaches to deference, which is based on the idea that deference must end when there is an expert who defers to no one else. One of his conclusions is that both approaches to semantic deference are incorrect, concluding that they do not establish the thesis that deference must end. However, Woodfield does not propose to prove that deference is never ending; he is limited to describing non-stopping deferential processes.

Woodfield summarizes in five points Fodor's approach: (1) Under usual circumstances, experts have the content of a concept earlier than non-experts do; (2) the fact that a non-expert comes to have the content of a concept depends causally on (A) the expert grounds which connects her to concept's extension and (B) the content information carried by the expert's concept; (3) in other circumstances an individual ignoring about the issue can be a way to acquiring the same information if play as an unwitting indicator in front of concept's extension (e.g., being allergic when in front of it); (4) the necessity of interpreting that experts' tokens of the concept are nomically correlated with certain kind-extension, intentionally making expert reactions being set

²¹ Like Burge (1979), where content attribution is construed as made based on a literal interpretation of the individual's words, Recanati (2000A, p. 461-2) construes words as concepts and not as labels associated with them. In his approach, using a word is then having a concept. A remarkable difference between Burge's and Recanati's approaches lies in their interpretations of concepts. Burge (1979, 1986) considers that concepts are conceived and used by experts in a standardized way. As a result, non-experts conceive deviated or incomplete versions of them. In this view, both experts and non-experts happen to entertain concepts. However, expert ones are the complete version or the true version. For his part, Recanati interprets concepts where individuals' recognitional capacities constitute them.

to it; (5) deference has to end at some point due to some concepts are not acquired by tapping into another.

For Woodfield, firstly, Fodor's view of deference does not describe the ordinary notion since deference is supposed to work *by the interaction* between the deferer and the deferee, so the acquired concept's content is fixed by facts related to the expert who made possible the semantic access. Secondly, Fodor's approach to deference misrepresents what individuals are doing since it shows the deferer with much control at hand, following policies about the deferee's mind and behavior and leading to conclude that she already has the concept that she is supposed to lack. Since she considers the deferee's behavior as a reliable sign of *that kind-extension*, on behalf of her employing a concept in every circumstance, e.g., *that kind of tree* for elm cases (Cf. Woodfield 2000, p. 439-440).

On the other hand, Woodfield states that Recanati's (1997) does not account for learning issues related to, firstly, the state between quasi-belief (the attitude for contents containing deferential concepts) and belief and, secondly, issues related to acts of deferring.²² For the second cases, formulate the following situation. Consider a student who picks up the word 'synecdoche' from her schoolteacher but does not fully understand its meaning. Consider also that the schoolteacher misunderstood it and incorrectly assigned the meaning of metonymies. Now, the student is talking with a linguist and says, 'Cicero prose is full of synecdoches,' to which the linguist corrects by saying that it has few but is full of other rhetoric forms. Then, the student accepts.

What is happening here is that when the student uses 'synecdoche,' she unintentionally refers to metonymies. Hence, the linguist is not disproving her, for she misunderstands what the other means, so she is beside the point. But there is another misunderstanding because the student accepts an inapt amendment. For Woodfield, Recanati's approach does not make communicational solutions, for if the student still defers to the schoolteacher after the linguist's correction, she refers unconsciously to metonymies but expresses a different thing and is illusory to consider that the student defers to the linguist as the latter say anything about metonymies in Cicero's prose.

²² The first issue is not addressed as the genesis of learning concepts goes further in the interest of the chapter.

According to Woodfield, the moral for cases where the original source is mistaken about a concept is not to link deferers to original sources in conversations like the one mentioned.

Additionally, Woodfield attacks Recanati's groundedness thesis by saying that though actual processes of deference do stop at a point:

it is not necessarily true that the deferring process had to stop at the point where it did. Nor is it true that the deferring necessarily has to stop somewhere. It could in theory go on indefinitely. The participants are not stuck without a resolution just because the latest judgment is defeasible. On the contrary, they commit themselves to the best judgment available at the time (Woodfield, 2000, p. 435).

For Woodfield, any agreement for the extension's resolution and the intension of a term can subsequently give way to a disagreement which, in turn, is later resolved by a new agreement. In this respect, Woodfield concludes that Fodor's and Recanati's approaches do not show that deference must stop due to neither offering a correct explanation of semantic deference. Thus, he adduces that if there is any stopping constraint is something that will remain unexplained until a suitable semantic deference approach is exposed.

On the other hand, Woodfield's proposal maintains that deference responds to an intentional act done owing to a reason. In standard cases, a deferer interacts with a particular expert and takes some policies in deference to her. Differently, the expert and the deferer accept that independent norms determine the meaning of a word and to which they adhere. The deferer recognizes human fallibility even to experts but decides to defer to particular ones because they consider them interpreters of the norms. Nevertheless, depending on the circumstances can overturn her position and change whom to defer to whenever necessary. For Woodfield (2000, p. 450), "[s]emantic deferring is underpinned by the desire to speak in accordance with the norms that determine objectively correct use."

Thus, according to Woodfield, linking the deferential operator to original particulars sources²³ introduces communicational and meaning/content grounding problems for deferers if deferee's natural/conventional terms use/concepts are deviated or misleading.

We adhere, though with some differences, to Woodfield's version of rational non-expert deferers, wherein they have criteria for revoking a deferential operation to a mistaken expert by maintaining deference to norms of objectively correct use. Let's look at some of our differences, a problem stressed in Woodfield's approach, and our proposal to solve it.

1.5. Elements of a modified deferential operator

The first difference that sets our approach apart from Woodfield's is our aim of maintaining a deferential operator, which allows for revoking criteria for operations targeting experts alone. The second difference concerns the scope of deferential operations since, for Woodfield, it encompasses whichever norms of objectively correct use are available. Our approach states that it is focused on determining an epistemic field and, consequently, its norms for using a kind term. Thus, while Woodfield's view is sketchy about the norms a kind term user applies, our view circumscribes them. The idea is then to maintain, as Recanati (1997, 2000A) does, that natural and conventional kind term uses instance, an indexical component, a character,²⁴ but widening the construal he made on the rule for their target application. Consequently, reformulate the deferential operator to include a solution to the problem of deferring to original particulars, one influenced by Woodfield's proposal but, as said, more circumscribed.

In this fashion, the approach matches a feasible *main deferential attitude* on the part of natural and conventional kind terms deferers to a modified version of Recanati's deferential operator. Such attitude is best suited to what natural and conventional kind term's users-deferers are doing. Hence, when there is also deference to an expert that is considered (that is currently present or not), such

²³ Remember that the deferee in the deferential operator can also be a community for Recanati. Woodfield, on his part, does not say anything about that. On the other hand, although Recanati does not say much about the role of the deferee as a community, I assume that they are considered straightforwardly as groups composed of individuals. More on this is below.

²⁴ Note that as it will be stressed below, according to Recanati, natural and conventional kind terms have different characters depending on their users.

an additional carried out attitude is best suited by Recanati's deferential operator, an attitude that depending on the deferrer's rationality can be placed as dependent or not to the main deferential attitude to represent her deferential attitude.

Let's begin with the required elements to formulate a deferential operator that surpasses the problematic consequences of deferring to original particulars. As said, Recanati uses Kaplan's theory of indexicals for formulating the deferential operator. According to Kaplan's (1989, p. 505-6) formulation, indexicals' have two component meanings, character, and contents. Character is what determines contents in different contexts. It is a metalinguistic rule that takes any indexical term within a quotation and introduces a rule of its use. For example, 'I' refers to whoever says/writes 'I.' Thus, they are "functions from possible contexts to contents," i.e., when used in any context according to the rule map onto particulars being considered (context sensitiveness).

For Recanati (Cf. 2000A, 463), analogous to Kaplan's view on typical indexicals, natural and conventional kind terms character rule for deferential concept's deferers is metalinguistic. Similar to the case of 'I,' where the rule says 'I' refers to the person who says 'I,' in the case of 'arthritis,' the rule says, 'arthritis' for a deferrer refers to what a physician she is considering calls 'arthritis.' On the other hand, for Kaplan (Cf. 1989 pp. 500-1), the content of indexicals is what it is said in the circumstance of terminological use, i.e., the appropriate extension of the indexical. In this respect, the content of indexicals is context-dependent and is the extension of the term at the time of use.

To surpass the problem of deferring to original particulars, the character's meaning rule must target what effectively grounds a deferential concept. Though at certain times deferring to an expert can effectively ground a deferential concept, as shown, experts can be mistakenly mastering a kind term use. On the other hand, having sketchy norms of correct use as a target can circumscribe norms that are not relevant to the deferrer's use. In this way, delimiting the field brings the way to the specific norms of correct use that effectively ground the deferrer's concept. Thus, natural and conventional kind terms use/norms of an identified community and their knowledge, i.e., an

epistemic community or a *knowledge field*²⁵ guarantees circumscribed and unified norms and use onto which a deferer through her deferential concept maps at a location and time.

Before describing how the character rule works in our approach, it is crucial to clarify in which ways it (our approach) both take elements and differs from Recanati's. We (1) state in advance to Recanati how character functions not only for natural kind terms but for conventional kind terms. Similarly to Putnam and Recanati, we (2) state that natural kind terms have an indexical component, but also that conventional ones have it. In both cases, it becomes operative after causal (direct or indirect) interactions are made to their extensions. In this sense, (3) states that both types of kind terms map their environments differently: while natural kind terms map through their character their environments onto their natures, conventional ones map through their character their environments (knowledge fields) onto the things they have been settled.

On the other hand, like Donnellan and Recanati, our approach (4) establishes a character structure for both kinds of terms when used deferentially.²⁶ According to this view, (5) states that both basic and specialized users/conceivers²⁷ are accounted for when they defer. In this vein, like Recanati's approach, (6) stresses differences in the character structure for cases of pure deferent, basic and specialized uses/concepts for natural and conventional kind terms.²⁸ The major difference is that it emphasizes how basic and specialized users of natural and conventional terms defer. Therefore,

²⁵ Though here I am using 'epistemic community' and 'knowledge field' as synonyms, the term 'knowledge field' can be used when a single individual is composing it, or no one is supporting it. What happens when there is deference to a knowledge field with no supporters? In such cases, grounding is delayed until new experts (or a new expert) support it. By 'knowledge field,' there can be considered a scientific community, such as physics or a specific social science, a community of engineers, such as civil engineers, philosophy, a specialty of any of them, and even groups of people with detailed knowledge, such as indigenous healers or shamans of a community.

²⁶ We assume that deferential uses of kind terms are linked to deferential attitudes. However, there are situations where kind term uses are made with deference without a deferential attitude being instanced, cases we call *deference by default*, according to Stojanovic et al. (2005). More on this is in chapter 2. Thus, in deferential uses of kind terms, we are prone to maintain that kind term uses/conceptions inherit the indexicality of deferential attitudes. Note that like natural kind terms, even though for extensional identification of conventional kind terms there is needed reference to a knowledge field, in a similar glance than natural kind term users with basic and specialized concepts that can identify their extensions without deference, users of conventional terms with basic and specialized concepts can use them by identifying their extensions and without deference by reference borrowing. For more on reference borrowing, see Rauti (2012).

²⁷ I am changing Recanati's 'scientific concepts/uses' for 'specialized concepts/uses' to consider additional technical disciplines than the scientific ones.

²⁸ I talk about pure deferential uses/concepts because I consider that basic uses/concepts and scientific uses/concepts can be used/conceived as deferentially without being used/conceived as entirely deferential as the former ones—more on this issue below.

it proposes a main deferential operator that represents 4, 5, and 6 related deferential attitudes.²⁹ Lastly, different than Recanati's introduction of deference to a generic group or an unstructured community to which deferers can defer and to which can consequently face the problem of deferring to original particulars, (7) our approach conceives structured communities (knowledge fields) with their norms of natural and conventional kind terms to surpass the problem of deferring to original particulars.

Let's describe the character rule for deferential users of natural and conventional kind terms. For a pure deferential use/concept of a kind term, the character's rule should say, e.g., "a natural/conventional kind term 'x' refers to what at the moment of the deferential act specialized y users/conceivers call 'x' and identify as x." Note that this formulation excludes deference to basic concept users as expected, according to the introduction of a deferential attitude towards particular norms of correct use mastered by a knowledge field. However, as will be seen, such a possibility can be added and represented with an additional operator (which can be concomitant to the main deferential operator). Differently, for a deferential use of a basic use/concept of a kind term, though it can be self-referential, its main target must be a knowledge field. Thus, it should say, "a natural/conventional kind term x that both specialized y users/conceivers and they call 'x' and identify as x refers to unknown linked information possessed by specialized y users." For deferential use of a specialized use/concept of a natural/conventional kind term, the rule can be self-referential, but its main target is her knowledge field. Hence, it should say "a natural/conventional kind term 'x' that both their y colleagues and they call 'x' and identify as x refers to unknown linked information possessed by her knowledge field."³⁰

As it can be seen, though the character in the three types of deference differs, there is constant the direction to a y community, i.e., a knowledge field. Such constancy has a twofold utility. Firstly, determine the knowledge field to which the three types of deferers are directed, in advancement in both Recanati's and Woodfield's lines that use an indexical account for deferential uses for kind

²⁹ The difference between a main deferential attitude and a subordinated deferential attitude accompanying it will be explained below and in the next section.

³⁰ Note that when basic and specialized users/conceivers defer, they are supposed to be limited to map additional information possessed by specialized users/conceivers, which is linked to information they have and extensions they identify, that can be limited to change intensional aspects that can make minimal changes in extensional factors or none.

terms and solve the problem of deferring to original particulars. Secondly, ensure the formulation of a main deferential attitude targeting knowledge fields and a subordinate deferential attitude that simultaneously targets individual experts.

As was stressed at the end of the previous section, we difference between implicit indexicality of a kind term and deferential indexicality. Implicit indexicality of a kind term is operative once causal interaction (directly or indirectly) is established with its extension. Implicit indexicality of kind terms maps the environment (physical surroundings in the case of natural kind terms and knowledge fields in the case of conventional kind terms) onto their extension, without any deferential attitude being operative. On the other hand, deferential indexicality, which is implicitly operative in deferential concepts and sometimes operative in basic and specialized concepts, is subsidiary. For natural kind terms uses/conceptions, there are not always dependency relations to knowledge fields for referring to them, which implies a difference between implicit indexicality of both natural kind and conventional terms uses/conceptions. However, in situations where there are dependency relations between natural kind terms uses/conceptions and knowledge fields, their implicit indexicality maps their environments: physical surroundings onto their extensions, and knowledge fields onto their extensions.

1.6. A modified deferential operator

According to Woodfield, a successfully deferential act concerning a kind term must be directed to its norms of correct use. However, natural and conventional kind terms deference in such a way is fundamentally unsuccessful due to two factors. The first is because the ‘norms of correct use’ of a kind term are pretty sketchy as a target for its meaning. The second one is because deference is an attitude towards other people in help for understanding, not to elements that by their nature lead deferers to understand. However, Woodfield is correct in directing deference to an objective field different than particulars. What I have proposed to surpass those two mentioned difficulties is to specify such an objective field and explicitly consider the role of current people in constituting it in a context of deference. Additionally, this proposal has been settled by making some changes in Recanati’s approach to related concepts of users of natural and conventional kind terms by characterizing the target of character for their uses.

In this fashion, as long as we state that for kind terms uses and related concepts, their character has as a target a current knowledge field (the one which has established, maintained, and advanced in them), we argue that successful deference requires what we call *primary identification conditions*, i.e., the identification of a knowledge field to which kind terms pertain as topics. Different than a model where deference can be strictly made to parts of a deferential chain, i.e., to original particulars (involving that the way to contents can be blocked when they are mistaken), and where deference is made to non-personal and sketchy issues, we adduce that the identification of a current community to whom defer guarantees a junction to contents for natural and conventional kind terms. Thus, our approach explains deference to particulars that pertain to a knowledge field by saying that primary identification conditions operate in a way that regulates the character of kind terms of deferers by enabling the identification of the knowledge field to which the representative is subscribed. Therefore, deference to an expert should go, firstly, through identifying the knowledge field to which she is a representative and then, secondly, to her.

In this vein, Recanati's deferential operator can still help represent deferential attitudes. Still, considering the elements proposed by our approach, it is crucial to introduce some changes. Accordingly, such a proposal can be limited to maintaining it without changes in its formulation but with changes in its construal. So, the deferential operator $R_x(\sigma)$ can be read by considering the x as a particular representant of a knowledge field that is identified by her profession interpreted in x , and whose knowledge field to which she is subscribed is the current meaning/concept provider of the kind term σ . Accordingly, a correct reading of an interpreted deferential operator must take the x 's knowledge field as the target of character and the disciplinary circumscription of both x and the natural or conventional kind term.

An advantage of this way of reading the deferential operator is bypassing the problem of deferring to an original particular. A disadvantage is that there is no way to represent cases where the expert is not subscribed or representative of the knowledge field. Another disadvantage is that no individual can be bypassed, as in cases where a deferer is considering a natural or conventional kind term when no specific expert has been considered. An additional disadvantage is that there is

no direction for choosing between the profession's label or specialty (e.g., *R_{biologist}(elm)* or *R_{botanist}(elm)*), leaving open the possibility of not emphasizing the achievements of a deferrer.

However, a plain *x* as a representation of the character target of the deferential operator involves some difficulties. Without any instruction for construing the symbolic formulation of the deferential operator, it can lead directly to the problem of deferring to original particulars. Differently, if the deferrer's character target of natural or conventional kind terms is specified in the deferential operator, an application of a character rule free of original particulars can be included. But, for such a specification, an account is needed to state why technical kind terms' deferers mainly target communities who made and maintained objective rules of use. It is not only a matter of deferring to the right thing but one that states that it is a generalized aspect when kind term users defer.

Our approach answers these two questions by stating, in Woodfield's vein, that deferers gradually become aware that particular experts as deferees are not the primary sense givers of natural or conventional kind terms. In this fashion, as they can conceive that there are norms of correct use of terms, deferee fallibility becomes a potential fact, leading them to redirect deference when necessary. So, in advance to Woodfield, we appeal to a gradual recognition/identification of primary sense givers of technical kind terms by deferers.³¹ Consequently, our approach answers the above questions by stating that there is a point where deferers not only begin identifying primary sense givers, which leads them to establish a proper way to defer but suggests that deferers obtain such competence in a generalized way.

At the same glance, different than Woodfield, our approach places prominence on the community that finds, makes, and maintains norms of correct use instead of such norms, thus specifying more accurately where they lie. Now, if the rationality of deferers involves the recognition of primary sense givers of terms, there must be primary identification conditions for sense givers. In this line,

³¹ Here and after with 'technical kind terms,' we refer to conventional kind terms and natural kind terms of two types: (1) those that are entirely dependent on a knowledge field for their use (that can be considered as technical-natural kind terms), and (2) those that are not entirely dependent on a knowledge field for its use (that can be considered as basic or basic-technical. Basic in the sense of being used without considering a knowledge field and basic-technical in the sense of linking technical uses to basic ones).

we propose an amendment to Woodfield's target: deference cannot be just to rules of use, an issue to which deferers can be somehow blind, but to people who enable access to them. Consequently, the specification to which a deferential attitude is directed, the target of character, must be aimed at those who allow suitable content.

In this vein, if on the deferers part, there is a generalized conceptualization for sense givers of kind terms that lead to their identification, then their inclusion in the operator becomes imperative. Accordingly, if the main target of deferers is sense giver communities (knowledge fields), there must be a place for their specification in the character target. That said, putting the specific specialty, if any, at the character target blank is suggested.

Any other way, if conceptualized communities are the primary character target of deference for natural and conventional kind term meanings/concepts, deference to particulars must involve both a conceptually different deferential operation and a derived one for those linked to the main deferential attitude. Accordingly, if deference to conceptualized communities makes conceptual differences from deference to particulars, such an issue can be shown with differentiated deferential operations. Considering that an alternative reading of Recanati's deferential operator has limitations for accurately stressing linked information to deferers' attitudes, it must be considered inadequate and discarded.

On the other hand, the second way to keep using the deferential operator is to modify it to represent a knowledge field as the target of the character of natural and conventional terms. In this last case, deference to an expert is discarded, and a knowledge field is established as the target of the character of the deferential operator. So, deference to a knowledge field is considered the main deferential attitude when a natural and conventional kind term is deferentially used/conceived. Nevertheless, if there is deference to an expert³² on the matter (that could or could not be a representative of the field of knowledge), using the modified deferential operator in conjunction with Recanati's deferential operator will be necessary. This shows, as suggested above, that when

³² As in cases of natural deference to a representant of a knowledge field, incomplete mastering of character and epistemic deference. For a definition of 'incomplete mastering of character,' go to the last paragraphs of this section. For an explanation and discussion of 'epistemic deference,' see the next section.

a deferrer uses a natural and conventional kind term and an expert on the matter is considered, two deferential operations are at stake.

The modified deferential operator (a modified version of Recanati's deferential operator) is then proposed to characterize what natural and conventional kind term users do when deferring. In the operator, the subscript x is replaced by the subscript kf , which contains the knowledge field's initials and works as the main operator for kind term users when deferring. Thus, in cases where a natural and conventional kind term user is deferring without considering an expert, the main deferential operator $R_{kf}()$ applies, for instance, in $R_{botany}(elm)$. On the other hand, in cases where a natural and conventional kind term user is deferring to an expert, additionally to the knowledge field deferential operator $R_{kf}()$, Recanati's deferential operator $R_x()$. Thus, the way such operations occur can be represented as:

$$R_{kf}() \vee (R_{kf}() \wedge R_x())^{33}$$

For instance, in $R_{botany}(elm)$, where a deferential operation without considering an individual deferee works alone and is represented by the modified deferential operator. Or, on the other hand, in $R_{botany}(elm) \wedge R_{teacher}(elm)$, where a deferential operation to a knowledge field is working in conjunction with a deferential operation to a considered individual. It can be characterized by the modified deferential operator in conjunction with Recanati's deferential operator. Since deferers have different extents of identification conditions, the term 'knowledge field' works as a parameter to specify the specific heading in it as far as possible with the knowledge field they manage to identify.

At this point, one may ask: deferring to an expert involves a one-way-directed deferential attitude or a multiple-way-directed deferential attitude? According to a putnamian division of linguistic labor, deferring is a one-way directed activity where the more experts collaborate with the lesser experts by correcting them and one where the lesser experts are disposed to be corrected by the more experts. However, one-way directed deference can be an activity that goes besides to a

³³ Formally: $\exists(x)R_x(\sigma)$ iff $R_{kf}(\sigma)$; when x has a relationship with kf .

putnamian division of linguistic labor since people can defer one-way directly to an insulated wise person with very original or *sui generis* thoughts that do not belong to any epistemic community and to other people who are not considered as experts by deferring to their idiolect when try to understand what they mean. In those cases, Recanati's deferential operator alone works properly to characterize such deferential attitudes.³⁴

What about those cases where deference is mainly directed to a knowledge field through a representative or even to someone who is not a representative but further in the division of linguistic labor? We propose to consider them *multiple-directed deferential attitudes* insofar as there is more than one target at stake. This way, multiple-one-way-directed deferential attitudes and multiple-different-way-directed deferential attitudes can be differentiated. We are concerned in this chapter with the first class of attitudes.

In such cases, as the expert is part of a set of individuals who constitute a knowledge field (and the very target of character), Recanati's deferential operator is construed as conceptually subordinated to the knowledge field operator. However, there is still a link between deferential operations in cases where there is no strict subordination, i.e. when the deferee is not a representative of the knowledge field and keeps a different position in the linguistic labor chain. Since our characterization of technical kind terms' users-deferers use two operators where the topic (natural or conventional kind term) is maintained, and the character target can be specified, its scheme can be used for setting an approach towards multiple-different-way-directed deferential attitudes. Therefore, such specifications can be added to different sense-giver communities or knowledge fields.

1.7. Character normativity: a sketch

A widespread way to use indexicals involves a rule for their correct application. That character can be applied or misapplied involves the normative assumption that there is a rule for its proper application. Accordingly, as technical kind terms count as having indexical components when used, there are rules for their proper application. Based on Recanati (2000A), in 1.5, we stated that

³⁴ See Stojanovic et al. (2005).

there are two ways of kind term use: they can be used according to what they mean, in which cases implicit indexicality is operating, and they can be used deferentially, in which cases deferential indexicality is operating.

In the first, it was said that the character of natural and conventional kind terms maps environments differently in each case since natural kind terms' character maps from their paradigms of use onto their natures. In contrast, conventional ones' character maps from their paradigms of use onto their expert communities and then onto the referents they have fixed.³⁵ In the second, we state that technical kind terms use with deference, also instance, a rule-following character that maps the knowledge field that has established its use in three different ways. For pure deferential uses, character maps a knowledge field onto their fixed extensions and linked information; for basic uses with deference, character maps a knowledge field onto related information, while for specialized uses with deference, character maps the knowledge field to which the deferrer subscribes onto linked information.

So, in each type of indexicality, characters are said to follow the rules differently. Even within each type, there are variations of character that also follow different rules. We adduce that rule-following characters are structured through a stage where a kind term is introduced, deference is operating, and identification conditions are established. At this stage, initial rule-following shows identification conditions between kind terms and their extensions, while rule-following characters of implicit and deferential indexicalities are structured. Then, after this stage, rule-following characters become operative for mapping from environments onto extensions.

Accordingly, in an introduction of a kind term, there is a direct or indirect causal interaction to its extension. This issue involves identification conditions of its extension³⁶ plus establishing their relation. Hence, a kind term's implicit indexicality becomes operative (i.e., that its character becomes operative so that with its use, the environment is mapped onto its extension)³⁷. In contrast,

³⁵ See the last paragraph in 1.5. and footnote 31.

³⁶ In both conventional kind term and natural kind term uses, which depend on aspects that relate them to a knowledge field, identification conditions are done according to the knowledge field that uses them.

³⁷ A knowledge field onto its extension for conventional kind terms uses, and the environment onto its nature and a knowledge field onto its nature for natural kind terms dependent on aspects that relate them to a knowledge field.

a structured pattern of use is established, a basic rule-following which can be specified with a general statement that takes any of the following two forms: (i) ‘such and such kind term use’ refers to ‘that extension’ (or such and such extension for indirect causal interaction), or (ii) ‘that extension’ (or such and such extension for indirect causal interaction) is labeled with ‘such and such technical kind term use.’ A consequence of any of such rules is the establishment of a more general rule which also can take any of the two following forms (1) there are ‘technical kind term uses’ which refer to distinctive extensions, or (2) there are distinctive extensions which are labeled with kind terms uses.

Similarly, in an introduction of a technical kind term, there is a direct or indirect causal interaction to the knowledge field that (technically) uses it, an issue that involves identification conditions of it plus the establishment of their relation. Hence, a technical kind term’s deferential indexicality becomes operative, i.e., that its character becomes operative so that with its use, a knowledge field is mapped onto its extension³⁸. In contrast, a structured pattern of use is established, a basic rule-following which can be specified with the general statement that follows: ‘such and such technical kind term use’ is set by ‘such and such knowledge field.’ A consequence of such a rule is setting up the general rule, which states that specific knowledge fields establish ‘technical kind terms.’

Note that in introducing a kind term, deference must be operating. However, this is the first step in structuring kind terms uses and involved characters. *Recognitional capacities* do an additional fundamental way of establishing character rules. In other cases, recognitional capacities help complement shallow introductions. Along these lines, for technical kind term uses with or without deference, recognitional capacities advance in the identification of primary sense givers: technical kind term users become aware that there are other experts different than those who introduce to them a technical kind term and become aware that there are more reliable users than others which also make up groups of experts. With their cognitive resources, they can *gradually recognize that there are primary sense givers* and acknowledge that they are widely established. Thus, with

³⁸ For conventional kind term uses a knowledge field onto its extension. On the other hand, for natural kind terms dependent on aspects that relate them to a knowledge field, the environment onto its nature and a knowledge field onto its nature.

recognitional capacities, technical kind terms users can find the proper way to use them with or without deference, develop uses (by deference), and become more competent when using them.

We state that identification conditions are working in the determination of primary sense givers of technical kind terms. In this vein, the acknowledgment that kind terms are circumscribed into topics is a way to determine that there are *types* of sense givers due to their *more suitable circumscription* to communities³⁹ than individual experts. Also, we maintain that for the kind term being circumscribed, the development of a dual-factor typification ranging from the typification of (natural and conventional) kind terms into topics to the typification of experts into communities, i.e., types of sense givers, must be involved. The next step contemplated is a pairing task or dual factor identification where relations between topics and type of sense givers become determined, and a link between kind terms to types of sense givers is established. Consequently, we state that circumscribing kind terms is a task that begins with typifications, then goes to determining relations between established identities, and ends in establishing linkages between kind terms and types of sense givers. Accordingly, we conclude that circumscribing kind terms, which lead to the development of identification conditions and linkages between established identities, help structure rule-following characters and open the way for following correct uses.

It is implicit in such qualifying practice that topics (with involved kind terms) are more suitable elements for being subscribed to a community than kind terms alone. Communities are shown as more suitable elements for subscribing topics than individuals. Additionally, communities are in a more suitable position for being considered as the basis that credit experts than individuals by themselves and that, consequently, enable access to the appropriate contents (so, not facing the problem of deferring to original particulars is guaranteed). With recognitional capacities involving dual-factor identification conditions, we adduce that kind term users *tend to arrive at primary sense givers*, a final identificatory step in which type of sense givers are identified. From this issue follows, as said, that communities are the source for crediting experts and what enables access to

³⁹ Note that all natural kind terms can be involved in knowledge fields. Still, insofar as for many natural kind term users their involvement is contingent, we consider a form of indexicality for natural kind term uses without linkages to knowledge fields.

content. Accordingly, we propose primary sense givers as a general⁴⁰ *identificatory tendency* taken by kind terms' users and users-deferers⁴¹ and as the suitable character targets of technical kind terms' uses.

Kind term users-deferers tend to follow a character norm. Natural kind terms should be used according to their extensions and knowledge fields that technically use them, while technical kind terms should be used according to their primary sense givers, i.e., the community who use them as elements of topics and help determine their referents.⁴² Misapplications of character cases (unlike cases of minimal temporary lapses) can be considered a consequence of non-competent use of the character of kind terms. Thus, as nothing precludes a deferer from misapplying kind terms' character and that it becomes recurrent cases of kind term's character misapplication (that are outlined in the list of types of character misapplication below), in particular, those that are recurrent can be considered as quite feasible phenomena and, therefore, as samples of *incomplete mastering of the character* of kind terms.

Accordingly, misapplications of the character target can happen in different ways. They can be applied narrowly, more widely, and changed. For natural kind terms and technical kind terms, cases of such misapplications are, respectively, applying it to particular things which do not constitute a natural kind or subscribing to the establishment of a conventional kind term use a particular instead of a community (typified by the problem of original particulars)—likewise, applying it to things contained by the natural kind or subscribing a conventional kind term to a community instead of a particular (when the topics are idiolectic uses). Also, applying it to things which contain the natural kind but also to other different things (even different natural kinds) or subscribing a conventional kind term to more communities than the one uses it within a topic. Finally, applying it to a different natural kind to the one it refers to or subscribing a conventional

⁴⁰ Note that here we are not considering epistemic deference (for a definition and discussion about 'epistemic deference,' see Stojanovic et al. 2005 and the next chapter. On the other hand, I put 'in general' insofar as there can be deference to idiolects in these cases. See also the following footnote. In addition, it is important to stress that we use 'primary sense givers' instead of 'knowledge field' due to its suitability for explaining the formation of rule-following characters.

⁴¹ We suggest using the main deferential operator in conjunction with Recanati's deferential operator to represent cases where a technical term user-deferer is aware of a community with one member in a specialty.

⁴² However, natural kind terms used technically should also be used according to their primary sense givers. See...

kind term to an individual different from the one that uses it, or even to a community different from the one that uses it as a topic or main topic.⁴³

Conclusions

Considering that Burge is limited to maintaining sharing content by making emphasis on extensional constraints or what we call situational domains of concepts, gives it a secondary role to causal relations (including deference) and is reluctant to accept indexical properties to kind terms, we stated that his approach faces two main problems for linking non-expert users of conventional kind terms and related conceptions to the expert uses and concepts of them. The first one has to do with different conceptual sources sharing extensions, and the other has to do with conceptual drift. Even in a domain of concepts that appeal to their conceptual proximity instead of their situational contiguity, we state that anti-individualism is left with the general particularities of scenarios and with no visible links between non-experts' conceptions to native experts' concepts that ground them. For suitable links to native particularities, we suggest not only considering causal relations between natural kind terms users with their extensions and conventional kind terms users with the knowledge fields which established them but considering an indexical component in natural and conventional kind terms uses which become operative with such interactions.

We list six core assumptions, five of them shared by semantic externalism and anti-individualism, which we label as *one-direction distribution of meanings/contents*. They are (1) one-to-one relation between kinds and kind terms, (2) exclusive expert sources, (3) expert's meaning's/concept's univocality, (4) deferential relations and expert cooperation, (5) situational domains of concepts, and (6) non-expert's kind term uses/meanings, and conceptions are also exclusive and univocal. We also state that one-direction deferentialism, which is exemplified by 4, can be considered as a view that states that exclusive and univocal meanings/concepts are shared in such a way through the collective linguistic body, therefore concluding that semantic externalism is an approach in such a line while anti-individualism is not.

⁴³ Note that for natural kind terms whose use depends on considering a knowledge field, all classifications between natural and conventional kind terms can be combined for uses that incur in the partial understanding of character, but also one of the composing character rules can be bypassed.

In line with the putnamian division of linguistic labor, we differentiate implicit indexicality from deferential indexicality of kind terms. We state that the first one becomes operative after causal interaction (direct or indirect) to the extension of a kind term has been established. In contrast, the second one, usually becomes operative after (direct or indirect) causal interaction with experts (a knowledge field) who technically use it have been established. We label both types of indexicality of kind terms as situational domains of kind terms' indexicality. Thus, considering a concomitancy between kind terms use (which involves causal relations and indexicality to different extensions and knowledge fields) and conceptions, in line with Burge's view on mental representations, we consider that mental contents of the protagonists in both Putnam's and Burge's scenarios are different.

In line with Recanati's distinction between deferential, basic, and scientific concepts, we propose changing the label 'scientific concepts' to 'specialized concepts' to cover disciplines different from scientific ones. Also, acknowledging that basic kind term users, in many cases, want to learn more about linked information to such terms and that disciplines generally undergo changes, we state that both basic and specialized concepts can be used deferentially. Additionally, considering Recanati's problem of deferring to original particulars and Woodfield's deference to norms of use, we state two issues. First, deference targets people for linking norms of use (contents and intensions for pure deferential users, and intensions and perhaps contents for basic and specialized users). Second, in targeting people with deference, the sketchy referent of norms of correct use is circumscribed by communities, i.e., by knowledge fields that establish and use them.

In this vein, we state that deferential uses/concepts of technical kind terms are fundamentally targeting knowledge fields that can be represented by the main deferential operator while subordinating deference to particulars that are subscribed to them (or somehow subscribed to them in the division of linguistic labor). Thus, we propose to use a modified deferential operator based on Recanati's deferential operator to represent main deferential operations and to use both the main deferential operator with Recanati's deferential operator for representing deference to particulars that are subscribed to the knowledge field.

The fact that main deferential operators can work together with Recanati's deferential operators to represent deference to particulars that are subscribed or somehow subscribed to a knowledge field leads us to consider that deference to individuals who are not subscribed to a considered knowledge field can be subscribed to another and conjecture *multiple-different-way directed deferential attitudes*, therefore to label our multiple-directed deferential attitudes more accurately as *multiple-one-way directed deferential attitudes*. Such conjecture is the point of the chapter's arrival, and an initial basis for a proposal on technical kind terms is used with different knowledge field sources (the aim of chapter 2).

In the final section, we sketch an account of how rules-following characters of kind term uses are structured. We state that there are two fundamental ways in which those rules are structured. The first involves introducing a kind term and its respective extension, and the second with recognitional capacities of technical kind term users. It was also considered that recognitional capacities could conclude the job of a shallow introduction. Introductions are regarded as elements that help in structuring rule-following characters, where in the case of natural kind terms, direct or indirect causal interaction to an extension happened, while in the case of conventional kind terms (and some natural kind terms), direct or indirect causal interaction with a knowledge field occurred. It was stated that a consequence of introductions of natural kind terms is the establishment of identification conditions of their extension and a relation between them with their extension. On the other hand, a consequence of introductions of conventional kind terms is the establishment of identification conditions of a knowledge field and a relation between them, their knowledge field, and their extension.

According to recognitional capacities, we stated that technical kind terms users structure rule-following characters by gradually recognizing that there are primary sense givers. For such gradual recognition and, thus, structuring characters to be the case, we stated that kind terms' users circumscribe them by typifying them into topics, but also say that by tending to typify experts into type sense givers, they lead to establish relations between the typified elements, what we call *dual-factor identities*. Such dual-factor identities, in turn, lead to the establishment of linkages between kind terms and types of sense givers. With recognitional capacities involving dual-factor identification conditions, we propose primary sense givers as the general *identificatory tendency*

that kind terms' users and users-deferers take and as the suitable character targets of technical kind terms' uses.

Considering that there is a tendency to follow character rules, maintaining that technical kind terms ought to be used according to their primary sense givers, we state that misapplications of character can happen due to a non-competent use of them. We label such misapplications as *incomplete mastering of the character* of technical kind terms. Ultimately, we describe the possible ways in which mastering character can happen.

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2. Multiple-way directed deference and synthetic meanings/concepts

Abstract:

The linguistic community or its standard language is often mentioned as the target of meaning/concept of language users by externalist approaches to mind and language. Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), and Stojanovic et al. (2005), for example, equate technical disciplinary uses to the standard language of the linguistic community. However, according to sociolinguistics (Milroy & Milroy, 2000), language users often use terms non-standardly or standardized variants of the more extensive standard dialect. Our proposal introduces theoretical elements of sociolinguistics to setting up an externalist approach that deals with different language sources for a kind term. Also, we propose a more inclusive approach where ‘the linguistic community’ is used as the set which contains all language sources instead of equating it to ‘the leading standard language source.’ We introduce and discuss Stojanovic et al. (2005) approach to deference and adopt many of their theoretical terms to develop additional categories and highlight further deferential operations. Additionally, emphasize concurrent deferential operations and use Recanati’s deferential operator and modified versions to characterize deferential operations where different types of deference and sources are covered. Finally, we conclude that meanings/concepts of kind terms with practically the same extension, assembled from different language/conceptual sources, are *synthetic meanings/concepts* and stress that in cases where more than one source is involved, there are elements for accounting for meaning/concept change and that it can be the basis for developing an externalist account of meaning/concept change, i.e., a dynamic externalist approach.

Keywords: Externalism, anti-individualism, deliberate deference, deference by default, Recanati’s deferential operator, the linguistic community.

Conceptual framework keywords: synthetic meanings, synthetic concepts, language source assignation by default (LSAD), partial understanding of character, language source, epistemic source, knowledge field, technical sociolect.

Introduction

Externalist approaches, such as Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), and Stojanovic et al. (2005), have not examined in depth their idea of ‘the linguistic community.’ Their uses of standard meanings and technical uses by disciplinary experts are equated without discussion. On the other hand, Stojanovic et al., in addition, consider ‘the linguistic community’ as a language source (the main one), but, according to sociolinguistics, additional language sources are considered. In this chapter, we propose a more pluralist externalist approach that re-set the idea of ‘the linguistic community’ and deals with language sources established by sociolinguistics and additional deferee sources.

In 2.1, we expose Stojanovic et al. (2005) taxonomy of deference, particularly their distinction between linguistic deference and epistemic deference. Also, we elucidate their distinction between deference by default and deliberate deference for linguistic deference. Finally, we consider their view on incomplete mastery of concepts as an independent issue of both types of deference. In 2.2, we discuss difficulties in Stojanovic et al. taxonomy and propose some advancements. In 2.2.1, we discuss the difficulties of their view on deference by default, especially related to how it is supposed to map language sources. In 2.2.2, we criticize their view on partial understanding, particularly their view on orthogonality they assume between partial understanding and deference, based on Recanati’s deferential concepts. Also, we propose an alternative view on deference by default and some criteria for linking deferers to original sources when they deferred mistakenly.

In 2.2.3, we expose our view of *partial understanding of character*, a variant of partial understanding of meaning. We describe its relation to deference and characterize in which ways it happens. In 2.2.4, we discuss Stojanovic et al. view on ‘the linguistic community’ and expose its limitations and implicit problems in its definition. Also, discuss the role of different language sources for deferers and propose a different definition. In 2.2.5, we expose concomitant deferential operations considered by Stojanovic et al. and add additional concurrent deferential operations. In 2.2.6, we discuss the problem of indetermination of language sources for deferers and propose a way out of the problem. In 2.2.7, we suggest using Recanati’s deferential operator and modified versions to characterize different types of deference with different sources and several deferees. In the final section, 2.2.8, we set the view of multiple language sources and divisions of linguistic

labor, their impact on deferees and deferers, and their relation to synthetic meanings/concepts and meaning/concept change.

2.1. Stojanovic et al.: a taxonomy of deference

Stojanovic et al. (2005) make a taxonomy of deference. They distinguish linguistic deference from epistemic deference and differentiate between deference by default and deliberate deference within linguistic deference. They also consider that incomplete mastery of concepts is an independent issue of these types of deference.

According to Stojanovic et al., linguistic deference involves language use and the meaning of words. On the other hand, deference by default refers to the view pointed out by Putnam and Burge that truth conditions of individuals' expressions are determined by a contextual language parameter, i.e., a source of language. So, deference by default occurs in every act of communication when people use and construe language expressions by taking by default a contextual language parameter that can be exclusively the language of a larger surrounding community, a dialect, sociolect, or even an idiolect. Usually, deference by default is overlooked by language users and takes place independently of individuals' intentions to defer. However, this is not to say that deference by default is always defined as unconscious states of speakers, for they can be aware that they are deferring by default.

Deliberate deference, for its part, is an intentional act where an individual use consciously an expression according to a linguistic context of use marked by an idiolect, a sociolect, a dialect, or a larger language. As a result, by exploiting contextual features, the individual enables people to recognize issues related to the specified context and to be identified as an intended deferer. In this fashion, a deliberate deferer explicitly encourages a suitable language shift when deferring to an idiolect, sociolect, or dialect terminology. Also, a deliberate deferer resorts metalinguistic remarks or distinctive intonation patterns when deferring to the norms of a larger linguistic community. Epistemic deference, for its part, arises as an intentional act not based on independent grounds and which is limited to personal reasons and evidence at hand for wholly or partially trusting upon certain information deployed by other people's opinions or the first expert in sight, and not necessarily for the real meaning of a term.

Moreover, Stojanovic et al. consider that incomplete mastery of concepts is *a separate issue* from any type of deference. There are grades for mastering a concept; in any of their cases, there is no necessary implication of a particular type of deference. For Stojanovic et al., mastering a concept is orthogonal to deference, for people can always decide or not decide to defer independently of their level of mastering it (Cf. Stojanovic et al., 2005, p. 26). People can incompletely master a concept and decide not to defer to anyone when using it. Conversely, people can master concepts without self-confidence and may choose to defer epistemically to another expert. Thus, a kind term user can use a term borrowed from a particular person without deferring epistemically or borrow it from a language source without deferring linguistically. On the other hand, insofar as epistemic deference involves using terms in a linguistic context, epistemic deference involves deference by default.

2.2. Some difficulties in Stojanovic et al. approach

2.2.1. Deliberate deference, deference by default, and language sources

With both concepts of epistemic deference and deference by default, Stojanovic et al. state that the problem of deferring to original particulars does not arise. Firstly, state that cases of deference to individuals in the sense of original particulars users of kind terms are cases of epistemic deference. Secondly, state that independently to such cases of deference, with deference by default, the deferer is linked to the linguistic use of the linguistic community, of a dialect, a sociolect, or an idiolect. Thus, there is no chance of not deferring to the original language source. As Stojanovic et al. (2005, p. 15) stress, Woodfield's approach is limited to linking deferers to the linguistic community because it disregards dialects, sociolects, and idiolects.⁴⁴

However, their approach is unclear on the criteria for identifying the specific language source of kind term users in the case of deference by default. They say: "whenever an utterance is produced for the purpose of communication, the participants in the communicative exchange have to settle

⁴⁴ Also, given that Woodfield's solution to the problem states a very optimistic view of the rationality of deferers, he does not consider deference issues related to irrationality. For instance, cases where people defer epistemically when they should be deliberately deferring to a community, as in (1) non-experts with exceeding self-confidence self-defer instead of deferring to experts, and (2) cases of partial understanding of character (see chapter 1, section 1.7.). On the other hand, in cases where a bias undermines the character target, as in (3) leading experts with a lack of self-confidence led them to defer to others instead of themselves when they can set a norm in the knowledge field. Other cases are (4) limited reasons to defer for doctrinarians and (5) limited evidence to defer for excessively meticulous people.

on a language with respect to which interpretation can be carried out, i.e., the source language” (Stojanovic et al. 2005, p. 8). Then, it is necessary to explain that kind term users have settled to a language source and that they defer by default. Is such settling non-intentional? To answer this question from Stojanovic et al. approach, it is needed to consider that they say that: (1) the concept of deference by default has its roots in Putnam’s and Burge’s externalists approaches, where utterances’ truth conditions are determined by a language source (Cf. Stojanovic et al. 2005, p. 1), (2) that deference by default commonly occurs unconsciously, but that it can become conscious and, (3) when using a term, the realization of that it belongs to such and such a language source after contact with its users (which might not be the original source but considered as representants of it), plus epistemic deference to them, is enough for ascribing deference by default to the genuine language source (Cf. Stojanovic et al. 2005, section 2.1.3 and p. 14).

In the case of 1, it is essential to consider that deference by default works differently in Putnam’s (1975) and Burge’s (1979) approaches. Putnam’s approach is limited to talking about natural kind terms, so there are two ways of establishing truth conditions. One is through the natural kind term’s indexical component, and the other is through the division of linguistic labor. The first one is pure by default way of assigning truth conditions to natural kind term use. The second uses deference as an attitude and activity, allowing a different route to access truth conditions. Here there is, not, strictly speaking, something as deference by default. On the other hand, Burge’s approach focuses on somehow conventional kind terms and states that using a kind term by being in a particular linguistic community secures its truth conditions. So, here there is a by default way of ascribing truth conditions to kind term users without considering deference as a necessary attitude and activity for such an ascription.

Thus, by considering a division of linguistic labor and an approach to community language location for kind term users, Stojanovic et al. state their concept of deference by default according to 2. However, is 3 the one that allows understanding of how Putnam’s and Burge’s contributions work in their approach. On the one hand, in the putnamian vein, the realization that a term use belongs to a language source opens the way to deliberate deference, but also contact with users of the term opens the road to the division of linguistic labor through epistemic deference. Also, in the burgean vein, realizing that a term use belongs to a language source opens the way to deliberate deference. However, deference by default operates even when there is no deliberate deference and

where there is epistemic deference. Additionally, such a realization would make it possible for epistemic deference to be redirected and the term used amendable.

An important point to be stressed is that there is missing in Stojanovic et al. approach an emphasis on stating that *one's deliberate deferential attitude towards the established use is, at the outset, what supports it from then on for attributing deference by default*. Such a statement results from assuming that a deferer can become conscious of a kind term use by default. This missing makes it difficult to recognize in their paper the importance of deliberate deference for attributing deference by default when there are different language sources at the deferer location. Burge's anti-individualist approach does not consider this question either.

2.2.2. Partial understanding and deference

On the other hand, Stojanovic et al. state that a partial understanding of a term does not constrain people to defer linguistically or epistemically. For the first case, they say, “[a] woman who knows virtually nothing about arthritis, except that there is something called “arthritis,” can use this word to say true or false things, whether or not she has any intention to defer linguistically at all” (Stojanovic 2005, p. 28). For the second case, they say (2005, p. 29) that out of inner condition and independently of any level of mastery about a term, individuals can decide not to defer. Accordingly, a partial understanding of a kind term occurs apart from any intention to defer both linguistically and epistemically. However, one may ask how someone can pretend to say somewhat true or false about something she knows virtually nothing about? Or how can someone decide not to defer epistemically to something she does not minimally understand? She almost must know something since, for choosing not to defer, one must know minimally to what is deciding not to defer, i.e., she must at least grasp a term's stereotype.⁴⁵

Interestingly, Recanati's deferential concepts are a paradigmatic case for establishing a link between the partial understanding of meanings and deference. This is because, for a partial understanding of meaning being operative without deference, the deferer must learn to borrow the reference of the term used, an aspect not reached by her with a deferential concept. However, when an individual *use at a first time* a kind term, at the very beginning, she cannot choose not to defer

⁴⁵ For example, any relation that can be established between the term with types or types of types.

insofar as for a minimal understanding of its use she must have a deferential attitude. In other words, to use a kind term is necessary to establish in a first stance its source (a character and its target; part of its meaning; a minimal stereotype). Also, a deferential attitude is necessary to target such a source to acquire its content or part of it.

So, there is no way of initially using a term of which one virtually knows nothing without the attitude of learning something about it and accepting being corrected. In particular, there is an initial point where (very) partial understanding, where there is a point of uncertainty about a minimal stereotype application to a kind term, constrains people to defer to understanding the issue at hand better. Therefore, *partial understanding is necessarily linked to deliberate deference in the preliminary stages of kind terms use*.⁴⁶ Now, when people borrow a stereotype or a referent, there is room to decide whether to defer.⁴⁷ Therefore, before recognizing any element linked to a term use, there is not possible not to defer (note that the more preliminary stage in partial understanding is the acknowledging of a stereotype, so there are two initial stages where partial understanding and deference are linked: (1) the synchronic stage between deference and the way a stereotype is apprehended, so a stereotype begins to be acknowledged and borrowed, and (2) typical Recanati's deferential concepts cases. Unless the stereotype linked to a term involves people to whom, in principle, one does not defer by personal or doctrinal considerations, in stage 2 cases, deference and partial understanding are linked).

Accordingly, in preliminary cases of deliberate deference to x term, (i) a character target/term's source is learned.⁴⁸ At the same time, (ii) the conception that there is x term with an originally

⁴⁶ Like deference by default, I take deliberate deference as a deference type that is transversal to semantic deference and epistemic deference—more on this in the next section.

⁴⁷ In addition to Rauti's (2012) approach, we state that reference borrowing can be concomitant to deferential attitudes. Even borrowing stereotypes can be concurrent with deferential attitudes. Both concomitances can occur because a reference and stereotype borrower of a term can always defer to someone who knows more about its use. Thus, as nothing prevents a reference/stereotype borrower from deferring to someone more expert in its use and information, there can be mixtures between basic concepts (those that can be equated to reference/stereotype borrowing) and deferential concepts. See also chapter 1, section 1.5.

⁴⁸ Look that this initial learning can be equated to what Recanati calls *the interpretation principle* by introducing the kind term in a mental sentence: "A mental sentence must possess a definite meaning (a character) even if it falls short of expressing a definite content" (Recanati 2000B, p. 283). However, as stated below, such initial learning can be extended to subsequent uses where the individual is unaware that she is deferring, i.e., when deference by default is operating. Since in normal conditions learning and deciding to use a kind term (even in cases where character alone is handling) involves its use as an interpreted symbol from then on, in such cases, subsequent kind term uses when no deliberate deference is working involve are interpreted and warrant deference by default.

established use begins to be endorsed. However, language source term identification does not imply its authenticity as the original source. Concerning i, the character target can be mistaken and not involve knowledge of its content (a second learning step involving knowledge of its stereotype and later of its referent). Considering that deliberate deference to meaning/concept sources (mistaken or not) involves deference by default operativity to such sources, deference by default arises linked to deliberate preliminary deference. Therefore, it can also be considered (in this early stage) as a consequence of partial understanding.

According to Stojanovic et al., deferers only become conscious of the language source they are linguistically deferring. However, considering the formula *first deliberate and then by default*, and deliberate aspects involved in epistemic deference, when deferers defer linguistically or epistemically to any source (even mistaken ones), they only become conscious of what they have deliberately deferred.⁴⁹ Therefore, deference by default in such cases only maps such sources. However, one may ask, how deferers be aware of a (linguistic) source they ignore, as Stojanovic et al. suggest, for every use that can be attributed to a linguistic use? If deference by default in such cases maps the language source that has established the term use, they stand in a burgean-derived anti-individualist approach. However, it needs to be clarified how this issue fits with their claim that deferers who defer by default can be conscious of the language source they are deferring.

Differently, we state that in the origins of x term use, a deliberate deferential attitude concurrent to *the conception that it has an originally established use to which she intends to defer* (an issue that also involves her thought that she could be deferring mistakenly), is what enables an individual to change a mistaken character target. At the same glance, we are prone to state that in targeting a mistaken source, such conception allows for linking her use to its original language source. Ignoring such a conception implies leaving out an involved conceptual aspect in every deferential act, one that explains the liability of a switch between sources. However, a deferer can be reluctant to defer to a different source than the one to she is deferring. In such cases, becoming aware of the source stops deference, and only reference borrowing is operating. Consequently, since the ignorance of an original source can be the case when a kind term user defers, and the source is core constitutive of its meaning/content, in such circumstances (before any refusal of deferring

⁴⁹ Deliberate deference as transversal to both semantic and epistemic deference. See the next section.

and borrowing reference), we propose to link a deferrer use to its original source. We call this form of deference by default Language Source Assignment by Default (LSAD).⁵⁰

2.2.3. Partial understanding of character and epistemic deference

In chapter 1, it was said that mastering the character of a technical kind term is to apply it correctly to an epistemic field and in subsidiary ways to particulars that act as representatives. On this wise, it was stated that *a form* of misapplying the character of a technical kind term is applying it exclusively to particulars without considering the community to which they are representatives, as it happens to Recanati's deferential operator.

Also, it was stated in this chapter that partial understanding of meanings/concepts is, in many cases, a concomitant issue to both deliberate and by default types of deference, not depending on individuals' choices. What about the partial understanding of the character of kind terms? Can both types of deference be concomitant to it and not dependent on individuals' choices? Considering that the character is a component of kind terms' meanings (according to Recanati (2000A) and some extent by Putnam (1975)), misunderstanding a character is a particular type of case of partial understanding of meanings/concepts.

Thus, suppose Stojanovic et al. accept that partial understanding of a character is a variety of partial understanding of meanings/concepts. In that case, their answer must be that partial understanding of character is orthogonal to deference. Again, we stress that in preliminary uses of a technical kind term where deferential concepts are undergoing (so previous to any reference borrowing), a partial understanding of character must be concurrent to deference. So, once deliberate deference is operating in this early stage, also subsequent deference by default. Therefore, it can also be considered that deference by default is a consequence of partial understanding. In any case of partial understanding, reference borrowing abilities are necessary for deciding whether to defer or not. Also, the character's target identification is necessary for determining whether to defer or not. However, on independent grounds of reference borrowing abilities, once the character's target is identified, the deferrer can decide to continue or stop deferring.

⁵⁰ For now, I am considering using the LSAD approach *only* for assigning language sources to natural/conventional kind term users-deferers who defer epistemically and ignore the term's original language source.

Unlike Stojanovic et al., we state that deliberate deference and deference by default also operate in both linguistic and epistemic deference. On the one hand, epistemic deference operates deliberately since it is a conscious intended act underpinned by sorted information that works as individuals' reasons to defer. Accordingly, epistemic deference arises as a deliberated act. On the other hand, epistemic deference can also operate by default after an epistemic deferential act is done, insofar as a deferrer can consider something to which she has linked opinions and judgments of a deferee but without consciously deferring to her at such moment. In such cases, deference by default is operating. Consequently, deliberate and deference by default are transversal to both the linguistic and epistemic spheres of deference (even for every case of misguided deference).

Misunderstanding the character of a technical kind term can take two forms. Firstly, within either the linguistic or the epistemic sphere and, secondly, between the linguistic and epistemic spheres. Thus, there can be cases where only the character target is switched within the linguistic sphere or the epistemic sphere, cases where there is no switch between character targets but a switch between the linguistic and the epistemic spheres, and cases where both the character targets and the linguistic sphere and the epistemic sphere are switched.

In any form, misunderstanding a character can lead to two different targets according to deference by default operations. In one case, deference by default operates according to the misguided target because when using a term, the deferrer can still defer to it without being aware of such an act. In the other case, deference by default, operates according to the original source. But for such deference by default to be the case, it is decisive that the deferrer had the prior intention to defer to the genuine target of meaning/concept (which involves the apprehension of the correctability of the deferential act). Once both last issues are considered, if the deferred source is mistaken, the original source is linked by the LSAD approach, and deference becomes operative by default. Both aspects are essential for accurately attributing LSAD because the deferrer can be reluctant to accept genuine sources (or some) because she pertains to a doctrine that prohibits them and redirects them.

On the other hand, when linguistic and epistemic types of deference are switched, and both a prior intention to defer to the genuine source and the apprehension of correctability of her deferential act are considered, the assignation by default of the actual type of deference becomes allowed. We

discuss deferential types assigned by default (DTAD) in such cases. Switches between both types of deference happen when (1) deferers assume their deference to opinions involving a kind term made by one or a group is its original meaning/concept, or when (2) identified original sources and their meanings/concepts are taken as if they have the nature of opinions.

2.2.4. Deference to the linguistic community and deference to a standard language

There are problems associated with Stojanovic et al.'s assumption that there is a *linguistic community* targeted by deliberate deference and deference by default. Firstly, they do not define 'the linguistic community'. Secondly, the term does not shed any light on the role expert sources play in it, mainly because Stojanovic et al. (2005, pp. 9-10) adduce that technical terms of an expert community –the case of race-walking experts– are considered as constituting a sociolect apart. In such a case, the assumption that a sociolect can be characterized as a language of experts that is distinguishable from the language of the linguistic community needs elaboration by Stojanovic et al.

According to Putnam's *hypothesis of the universality of the division of linguistic labor*

every linguistic community exemplifies the sort of linguistic labor...described, that is, possess at least some terms whose associated 'criteria' are known only to a subset of the speakers who acquire the terms and whose use by other speakers depends upon a structured cooperation between them and the speakers in the relevant subsets (Putnam 1975, p. 146).

According to Putnam, a linguistic community is fundamentally characterized by a structured dependence between term users, those who know the associated criteria, and those who do not. Thus, as Stojanovic et al. race-walking context example uses a meaning/concept of walking different than the ordinary sense use, we can suppose that the race-walking expert speakers constitute a parallel linguistic community characterized by a division of linguistic labor and constitute a sociolect. However, the walking-race experts' definition of 'walk' according to which "a progression of steps so taken that the walker makes contact with the ground, so that no visible (to the human eye) loss of contact occurs" (Cf. Stojanovic 2005, p. 10) is built on the current use definition of walking, insofar as what it is needed is that an athlete does not appear to perform what people do when are running.

Consequently, the following questions arise: (i) is race-walking experts' meaning/concept of 'walk' not the same meaning/concept of the linguistic community but applied to particular circumstances? (ii) How do we know if the language of the experts is the same as that of the linguistic community? (iii) What criteria exclude expert meanings/concepts from the linguistic community? (iv) if the meanings of the terms used by a knowledge field differ from those of the linguistic community, that means that they constitute a different linguistic community, i.e., a sociolect? An answer to these questions might be found in Stojanovic et al. appeal to Putnam's hypothesis of the universality of the division of labor. They say:

In an externalist framework such as ours, it is generally accepted that the meaning of legal terms is fixed by members of the legal profession for the whole of the linguistic community. There should therefore be no difference between the meaning that the judge ascribes to "felony" and "misdemeanor" and the meaning that these terms have in the [standard] lexicon of English. And if there were a difference, Kate, as a non-expert member of the audience, would probably choose to trust the norms of the linguistic community (as fixed by the body of experts alluded to above) (Stojanovic 2005, p. 21).

In this woodfieldian approach, Stojanovic et al. answer iii by saying that *for experts belonging to the linguistic community they must be the actual source of the terms used by the entire linguistic community*. That is not the case for the walking-race experts, as their use of 'walk' is not precisely the one fixed in the standard English lexicon. Hence, by answering iii Stojanovic et al. answer the remaining questions. In the case of ii, saying that if experts do not fix the meaning/concept, they are using a different meaning/concept than the linguistic community's (an additional source term fixation). In the case of i, by stating that walking-race experts' 'walk' is not the same meaning/concept as 'walk' of the linguistic community and, in the case of iv, by asserting that walking-race experts have their language, i.e., a sociolect. However, like the case of race-walking experts 'walk,' many terms adopted by epistemic fields have different meanings/concepts than standard lexicons, as in the case of 'water' in standard English dictionaries and chemistry databases,⁵¹ leading to the consideration that they constitute sociolects in parallel to the linguistic standard lexicons.

⁵¹ See the definition of 'water' in the Merriam-webster dictionary and Pub-Chem.

On the other hand, Stojanovic et al. assumption that standard meanings/concepts are those of the linguistic community implies that: (1) there is only one and leading standard language; (2) the actual term's meanings/concepts sources used by the entire linguistic community are fixed by experts and (3) those expert sources are exclusive.⁵² However, as we saw in the case of lexical definitions and databases definitions, there are no homogenous definitions between lexical dictionaries and scientific databases. This is a problem for assumption 3 and then for assumptions 1 and 2. But there are more problems. Let's begin with a problem that faces 1. Suppose there is considered, according to sociolinguistics, that even non-standard dialects tend to build up standard dialects in parallel to the more general standard language⁵³ and that even within particular language communities, there can be different kind terms' meaning sources within their languages. In that case,⁵⁴ the assumption of a *universal and exclusive standard use* for kind terms within a linguistic community is undermined.

There is also a problem that has to do with an exclusionary claim laying at the equation of 1, 2, and 3, i.e., that there are 'non-standard languages' and that they are out of the linguistic community. According to this view, sociolects and dialects are the counterpart of a standard language and are not included within 'the linguistic community.' However, as different sociolinguistics approaches suggest (see footnotes 53 and 54), dialects and sociolects, in turn, drift to standardization. The non-standard language is a variation of the standardized dialects and sociolects. If there are many standard languages, what is the reason not to include them within the definition of 'the linguistic community'? Even what is the reason for excluding non-standard languages? There is no answer for both questions from the discussed externalist/anti-individualist approaches since they have not considered sociolinguistics debates of standardization in languages. However, if we ask: what is the reason to consider dialects and sociolects different from 'the standard language' to exclude them from the definition of 'the linguistic community'?

The answer must lie in 3. It could also lie in linking 1 to 2 and 3. But, as we have seen, 3 is problematic as there are no exclusive sources for kind terms uses. In the same way, in linking 1 to 2 and 3, there is a misunderstanding since the standardized definitions can be, in many cases,

⁵² See chapter 1, section 1.2., for more about exclusive sources.

⁵³ For studies about different standard languages and standardization of languages, see Linn & McLelland 2002.

⁵⁴ See Milroy & Milroy 1999, pp. 50-51.

different than many technical scientific/disciplinary definitions. Accordingly, unlike Burge (1979), Woodfield (2000), and Stojanovic et al. suggest, there is more than a unique expert source for a kind term, even if we consider their view of the linguistic community. Additionally, where standardized meanings are in play, there are many non-standardized meanings. What is the motive to consider the more extensive standardized language plus academic/scientific languages as the linguistic community, excluding less large standardized and non-standard meanings/uses/languages?

To make the less large standardized and non-standard spheres of language operative, it is imperative to promote inclusive commitments when defining ‘the linguistic community’. An inclusive approach has the advantage of eluding demarcation difficulties (as in the case of academic/scientific sociolects) as far as the definition of ‘language community’ is concerned. In this vein, what is needed for deferential operations is to emphasize their sources and mark them according to their targets, i.e., if they are directed to users of a standard/not standard dialect and even to users of what is considered the more extensive standard dialect. Therefore, equating ‘the linguistic community’ to ‘the leading standard dialect’ (Stojanovic et al.’s linking 1 and 2) is avoided, and the inclusion of less extensive standardized and non-standard languages within a definition of ‘linguistic community’ is embraced.

On the other hand, such an equation and disregarding their particular users in deferential operations engenders some conceptual problems. In particular, using deference to the linguistic community faces not only the problem of the indeterminacy of an expert source (where the meaning/concept of both the standard lexicon meaning and an epistemic field of the same term is faced), but a problem of self-referentiality, since by its definition the deferrer is a part of it. Differently, using ‘deference to a standard language’ (Cf. Stojanovic 2005, p. 22), where topics/kind terms’ definitions of a knowledge field as deferential targets are considered instead of epistemic communities and their members, leads to the problem of explaining how deferers can always grasp accurately standard meanings/concepts without the help of experts and by using their reflection powers.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ For the same reason, Woodfield’s deference to independent norms of meaning faces the same problem. See Chapter 1, section 1.5.

Our approach solves the last problem by considering epistemic communities and their members as the suitable way to reach kind terms' uses accurately. Hence, according to it, using deference to a standard language makes a category mistake since it mixes up character and content aspects of kind terms by considering kind terms' definitions of a knowledge field as deferential targets instead of epistemic communities, which are the appropriate means for accurately reach them. Consequently, we state that 'standard language' should be considered a topic/kind term of linguistics (in particular, sociolinguistics) with definitions that can demand the guidance and clarity experts can offer.⁵⁶

Nonetheless, determining the language source is a problem for our proposal since lexical meanings of different language sources⁵⁷ and epistemic communities are available sources of meanings/concepts of the same terms. According to our approach to deference to epistemic fields, a way out of this problem is to circumscribe lexical information as a domain of a subfield of linguistics. This move goes from indeterminate sources to determined ones and guarantees a well-defined division of linguistic labor for lexical uses. Also, availability and distinction in other disciplinary (epistemic field) use. In this vein, lexical linguistics becomes a source that captures and accurately allows different language sources.⁵⁸

2.2.5. Deferential concomitancy

According to Stojanovic et al.'s approach, concomitancy between linguistic and epistemic deference occurs in two cases: (1) when a term is used with epistemic deference and linguistic deference by default maps its source, and (2) when deliberate linguistic deference is made at the time epistemic deference is operating. In the case of 1, concomitancy happens when there is deference to the opinions/judgments of a particular or particulars about the referent of a kind term. In contrast, deference by default operates by mapping, according to the context, a language source (a larger linguistic community, dialect, a sociolect, or an idiolect) of the same term. In the case of

⁵⁶ Even 'standard language' is a problematic term involving normative ideologies, so not all linguists are willing to endorse its usage. See Milroy & Milroy (1999).

⁵⁷ Usually, deferer's language source.

⁵⁸ Still, indetermination persists between linguistics source and any other technical source. See 2.2.6 for a way out of this problem.

2, when one deliberately defers to any language source about a particular meaning/concept while she is deferring to the opinions a particular or particulars has about it.

We propose to maintain 1 and 2⁵⁹ but in conjunction with the formula, *first deliberate deference and then deference by default*. Also, we want to state additional deferential concomitances. According to 1 and 2, there is only concomitancy between linguistic and epistemic deference. This issue must do, in part, with that deliberate deference when operating is blocking deference by default (since both are supposed to be linking the same character target). However, it is crucial to add an exception and maintain that linguistic deliberate deference can be concomitant to LSAD operations when it is unfortunate, i.e., when it results from a partial understanding of character. Thus, in one case, there is unfortunate linguistic deference to a wrong source, and in the other, deference by default to the genuine language source.

Nevertheless, according to the formula, deference by default is linked to the deliberate deference's target, which makes it operative. Thus, deliberate deference to a mistaken source leads to considering two deference by default concomitances: (i) a LSAD that is operating in connection to the genuine language source and (ii) deference by default that is operating in connection to the mistaken language source.

Note that in the case of 1, the concomitancy between epistemic deference and deference by default is maintained by our approach. But unlike Stojanovic et al., we consider that epistemic deference is initially operating deliberately and can subsequently be operating by default. Additionally, epistemic deference is a case of partial understanding of character targeting particulars and their judgments/opinions instead of accurate meaning sources. In that case, there is initially deliberate epistemic deference concomitant to LSAD. Afterward, a default epistemic deference can operate concurrently with it.

Furthermore, in the case of 2, since we propose that epistemic deference can occur deliberately and by default, we explain more consistently how concomitancy between deliberate linguistic deference and default epistemic deference occurs. Accordingly, whether it is that deliberate

⁵⁹ With a crucial difference in the case of 2 since we state that epistemic deference is a case of deliberate deference. See section 2.2.3.

linguistic deference or deliberate epistemic deference occurs in the first place, genuine concomitancy can only happen when any of them occurs by default because deliberate deference when operating blocks any other deliberate deferential act. Even considered sources for describing concomitances distinguish our approach from Stojanovic et al.'s. For example, they are limited to determining a more extensive linguistic community (the linguistic community), dialects, sociolects, and idiolects as language sources of deferential operations. Also, deference to particulars through epistemic deference. Additionally to those distinctions, we add epistemic fields, which work as technical sociolects in parallel to the rest distinguished language sources and targets of epistemic deference. And differently, we are unwilling to consider the larger linguistic community as different from a dialect.

In addition to Stojanovic et al. distinction between dialects, sociolects, and idiolects, according to sociolinguistics (see section 2.2.4), we state that within the category of 'dialect' are the subcategories of 'standard dialect' and 'non-standard dialect.' Thus, 'the language of the linguistic community' as a standard language that is regionally viewed is considered a dialect, particularly 'the more extensive standard dialect.' Accordingly, every more extensive standard dialect is not equated to 'the linguistic community,' which, different from Stojanovic et al. view, is considered to contain all the dialects, sociolects, and idiolects. On the other hand, academic and scientific languages, as variations of language occurring in social groups, are considered sociolects. In this sense, our approach states that *technical kind term uses are not necessarily standard uses*.⁶⁰

Thus, by distinguishing more extensive standard, standard, and non-standard dialects, our approach distinguishes key elements for identifying the origins/locations of deferers and deferee sources more accurately. Additionally, by differentiating technical sociolects⁶¹ from more extensive standard dialects, it offers criteria for determining the source type and solving related problems to indetermination of sources. Also, deference to a standard/non-standard dialect or a sociolect are not terms used by our approach, but deference to such and such community that use such and such kind term (for technical sociolects, deference to such and such knowledge field).

⁶⁰ Only when standard uses are based on technical kind terms can we consider that technical kind terms are standard uses.

⁶¹ For a discussion about technical sociolects in sociolinguistics, see Dvorak (2019).

Finally, any sources considered for linguistic deference can also be regarded as sources for epistemic deference.

Moreover, cases where types of deference are switched can involve additional deferential concomitances. Those are the situations where DTAD operates and fix the deferential attitude (even by assigning the original source when necessary, i.e., in those cases where linguistic deference is made to the opinions and beliefs of deferees).

2.2.6. Language sources indeterminacy?

Let's look at the source indeterminacy. When someone is using a kind term with both a standard lexical meaning and a technical meaning and using it with deference, one can ask to which source she is deferring. This can usually happen in more extensive standard dialects. For lexical meanings, people usually defer to known users of the term but also can go to a lexicographer or a linguist (lexicologist). However, if the term is also in the domain of a different discipline or not documented community, she can defer to a representative. These cases are in the domain of the deferer's recognition of sources of kind terms and her deliberate deference. How to identify the source of a kind term in cases where the deferer ignores the source for LSAD to operate accurately?

Any emphasis made in circumstances where a deferer uses a kind term is crucial for determining its source. For example, if the deferer is using the term to be adjusted to the regular use of the locals, the genuine source is lexicographers. The genuine source is lexicologists if she uses the term aiming for historical uses (etymology).⁶² If she uses the term according to such and such technical uses, the genuine source is such and such technical sociolect/knowledge field.

Now, more extensive standard dialects users usually face, in addition to their standard lexical meanings' sources, technical meanings' sources (from a technical sociolect) of the same kind terms. Accordingly, other standard dialects, besides their lexical uses' source, are prone to face standard lexical meanings' sources and technical meanings' sources of the same kind terms.⁶³

⁶² Except when there are no lexicographers or lexicologists for a dialect. In such cases, deference is limited to the dialect's term users.

⁶³ How to determine if standard and non-standard dialects use the same kind term? The easy answer is that they use the same morphological and phonological term. But we have to consider cases where they are not similar in such ways. Even the same morphological and phonological terms can differ according to the circumstances. We answer the

Similarly, non-standard dialect users, in addition to facing their lexical uses' source, are prone to meet the standard dialect uses' source. Note that for standard and non-standard dialects lexical meaning sources, parallel technical meaning sources comprise technical sociolects constituted by a subset of speakers different from those who conform technical sociolects in parallel to more extensive standard dialects. Thus, they meet their technical sociolects sources. Also, depending on the circumstances, they can meet the same kind terms' lexical standard and technical meanings' sources.

Depending on the circumstances, more extensive standard dialect users, standard dialect users, and non-standard dialect users can face more sources than those mentioned in this paragraph. For example, if they know several linguistic sources that use the same kind term and are considering them, or if they are situated at locations where two or more main standard dialects, other standard dialects, or different non-standard dialects are used. At this point, there are more linguistic sources for determining which of them is the original one when the deferer ignores which one is it. According to LSAD, such a task can be accomplished by considering if the deferer is trying to use the term following such and such ordinary use of such and such dialect or such and such technical sociolect of such and such society. To determine the original source accurately, qualified assistance is necessary. When required, the same applies to DTAD situations where deferee sources are re-assigned.

2.2.7. Deference and deferential operators

For deference by default to be operative, a language source or an epistemic source must be chosen even if they are mistaken in such cases. Thus, such a task requires that the deferer has done a previous deliberate deferential act, enabling deference by default when no deliberate deference is operating.

Chapter 1 stated that the initial use of a natural/conventional kind term involves identifying and learning that there is x language source for y kind term from the beginning. Thus, the ascription of deference by default to such a source is enabled once the source is recognized. Additionally, it was

question by stating that their sharing extensions are a criterion for determining sameness or equivalence between kind terms. In this way, if the terms' referent is fundamentally the same, we state that they are using the same or an equivalent kind term.

stated that acknowledging that there is an original language source for the technical kind term use leads to recognizing that there are original language sources and acceptance of an amendment if deferring to the mistaken source. Both issues open the way for applying LSAD to deferers' kind term use whenever they ignore the original source and defer to a mistaken one. So, to this story is imperative to add that whenever a deferential type is mistakenly switched, previous acceptance that there is a difference between a meaning and an opinion or personal view about it allows DTAD operability.

It was also stated that many instances of deference could be characterized by a modified version of Recanati's deferential operator alone or in conjunction with its original version. In this section, we present two new modified deferential operators based on Recanati's deferential operator that, in conjunction with it, can be used to characterize different types of deferential attitudes. The reason to use modified versions of Recanati's deferential operator lies in its limitations (see chapter 1, section 1.5.). Also, a limitation Stojanovic et al. stress is its impropriety to represent truth conditions of utterances where instances of deference by default are operating (see 2005, p. 14).

As Recanati's deferential operator was created to characterize deference to individuals, Stojanovic et al. state that Recanati's deferential operator represents epistemic deference, an issue that unlinks the deferrer from original sources when the deferee has a mistaken term use. We concur with considering that Recanati's deferential operator characterizes deference to an individual or a group of them but disagree that characterizing deference to particulars equals representing instances of epistemic deference. Our approach distinguishes between linguistic and epistemic deference to an individual, groups, and labeled communities. Thus, it is crucial to emphasize what type of deference is at hand to formulate the deferential operators correctly.

As I have stated in Chapter 1, section 1.5, both Recanati's deferential operator and the modified deferential operator can be used to characterize deferential acts where there is, and there is not present a deferee (an individual, groups, or labeled communities, respectively). In this vein, when they work together, they can be used to characterize situations where there is deference both to a present labeled community and to a group/individual of it, to a present labeled community and to a group/individual of them that is not, to a labeled community that is not present and to a group/individual of them that is present, and to both a labeled community and a groups/individual

of them that were not present. Additionally, it was said that Recanati's deferential operator alone could be used to characterize cases when (i) a deferee uses kind terms in very particular or deviated ways and (ii) very original and *sui generis* thinkers not subscribed to any knowledge field use kind terms in their own ways. At that time, the distinction between linguistic and epistemic deference was not considered, so it is now crucial to clarify i and ii with that distinction at hand.

Recanati's deferential operator does not specify information about the carried-out type of deference, i.e., if it is linguistic or epistemic, so it helps represent deferential acts where the deferrer does not identify the kind of deference performed. Differently, according to our approach, deferential actions, where there is considered that the deferred term has a socially established and endorsed use, are characterized by a specified type of deference, i.e., linguistic deference, which in turn involves a specified character target, i.e., a language-type source in the operator. Similarly, epistemic deferential acts, where judgments/opinions of the deferee or deferees are linked to a kind term use, are represented with a specified type of deference, i.e., an epistemic-type of deference, which in turn involves a specified character target, i.e., an epistemic-type source in the operator.⁶⁴

Note that deference to particulars as in i and ii could be considered either as a case of preliminary deference instancing partial understanding of the character of a kind term where no clarity is seen about the type of deference performed (if linguistic or epistemic) or simply, as a case of partial understanding of character where original sources are misidentified or, even, where both types of mistaken deference are at hand. Therefore, partial understanding of character is not only a matter of assigning a mistaken deferee source but a thing involving the way a deferrer deferred, which can also lead to a mistaken source.

Recanati's operator was used to characterize linguistic deference in the absence of a distinction between linguistic deference and epistemic deference in chapter 1, section 1.5. However, natural/conventional kind term users can defer linguistically or epistemically to i and ii cases. Consequently, a linguistic emphasis is missing for characterizing deference to i and ii with Recanati's deferential operator without ambiguities. In this wise, we consider two different uses for Recanati's deferential operator. The first use is suggested to characterize deferential operations

⁶⁴ As will be seen, the terms 'language-type source' and 'epistemic-type source' can also be held in their plural form 'language-type sources' and 'epistemic-type sources' when necessary.

which go with the modified deferential operator—for example, deference to an individual or group who pertains to the deferred knowledge field. The second use, according to 2.2.2, is suggested to characterize deferential operations where the deferrer has not yet identified the type of deference performed and the types of sense givers.

Those several elements listed above pose complexities for characterizing deferential operators systematically. Accordingly, this section proposes a systematic way to construe deferential operators alone and some initial ways they work together. Let's begin to list the deferential operators, beginning with Recanati's original deferential operator formulation for the unidentified type of deference and type of deferee/source:

(1) $R_x(\sigma)$

Regarding that, according to our approach, deferential acts characterized by Recanati's deferential operator can lead to their counterparts by default. Let's put a subindex D before the functor R for representing instances of cases by default:

(2) ${}_D R_x(\sigma)$

Note that LSAD and DTAD markers can be added to every operation for changing the deferee target and the type of deference performed when required. However, both LSAD and DTAD markers do not apply to Recanati's deferential operator insofar as with it, we are characterizing very initial instances of deference where no elements of language sources and epistemic deference are at stake.

Accordingly, we put a subindex D_s (by default source) and D_t (by default type of deference) before the functor R for characterizing instances of LSAD and DTAD operations, respectively. Hence, when users of kind terms defer or are considered to defer not to the best suitable or a mistaken source or to assuming a wrong type of deference, and are candidates for applying LSAD or DTAD deference, respectively, additionally to the deliberate and by default operators which represent deference to any of such cases, an operator with a D_s or a D_t marker characterizes deference by default to what it is considered the kind term's original source or the proper type of deference performed.

However, it is necessary to move first on to the main differential operators, which are the ones that mark the type sources. In chapter 1, section 1.4., the modified deferential operator was considered to characterize deference to technical disciplines or knowledge fields, but according to 2.2.4. there can be more expert sources than them. Regarding deference, there can be more language sources than first-hand knowledge fields (e.g., additional technical sociolects and lexical sources (standard and non-standard dialects)). Hence a character target label with a wider range of applications is needed.

In this vein, when characterizing deference involves situations beyond knowledge fields spheres, we propose to use ‘language source’ instead of ‘knowledge field,’ which is a broader category for the character target of linguistic deferers. Along these lines, we put the initials *ls* of *language source* for marking the language type-source subindex after the functor *R*, as in $R_{ls}()$. Additionally, we introduce the braces $[]$ in the operator after the type-source label to leave a blank for putting the deferee and to preserve the mark of the type of deference performed. Hence, the new modified deferential operator characterizing deference to a language type-source is:

$$(3) R_{ls[]}(\sigma)$$

At the same glance, we propose a character target with a wider range of applications for instances of epistemic deference. Let’s introduce the epistemic type-source subindex marked with the initials *es* of *epistemic source* and the braces $[]$ after them for characterizing instances of epistemic deference:

$$(4) R_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

For characterizing deference by default instances in both linguistic and epistemic operators, we have:

$$(5) {}_D R_{ls[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(6) {}_D R_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

Now, for characterizing LSAD instances for mistaken type sources of deference, we have:

$$(7) \text{DsR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \quad (8) \text{DsR}_{es[]}(\sigma) \quad (9) \text{DsDR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \quad (10) \text{DsDR}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

Finally, for characterizing DTAD instances for inaccurate types of deference performed, we have:

$$(11) \text{DtR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \quad (12) \text{DtR}_{es[]}(\sigma) \quad (13) \text{DtDR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \quad (14) \text{DtDR}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

Differential operators 1 to 14 characterize one-to-one deferer-to-deferee instances of deference. However, insofar as a deferer can, in a subsequent deliberate differential state, contemplate more than one (individual/group) deferee/source, we are compelled to introduce a second-step formulation for the differential operators that characterize such differential instances. Thus, let's formulate the differential operators by raising more than one deferee target after the functor R to cover such differential instances. So, considering 1 to 14 in order, we have the following differential operations:

$$\begin{aligned} (15) \text{R}_{x1, x2...}(\sigma) & \quad (16) \text{DR}_{x1, x2...}(\sigma) & (17) \text{R}_{ls1[], ls2[]...}(\sigma) & (18) \text{R}_{es1[], es2[]...}(\sigma) \\ (19) \text{DR}_{ls1[], ls2[]...}(\sigma) & (20) \text{DR}_{es1[], es2[]...}(\sigma) & (21) \text{DsR}_{ls1[], ls2[]...}(\sigma) & (22) \text{DsR}_{es1[], es2[]...}(\sigma) \\ (23) \text{DtR}_{ls1[], ls2[]...}(\sigma) & (24) \text{DtR}_{es1[], es2[]...}(\sigma) & (25) \text{DsDR}_{ls1[], ls2[]...}(\sigma) & (26) \text{DsDR}_{es1[], es2[]...}(\sigma) \\ (27) \text{DtDR}_{ls1[], ls2[]...}(\sigma) & (28) \text{DtDR}_{es1[], es2[]...}(\sigma) \end{aligned}$$

Summarizing up to this point, there are four five fundamental issues considered for setting the new differential operators: there are instances of deference characterized by (1) an unidentified type of deference and source or sources characterized by Recanati's differential operator; (2) identified the type of deference and deferee source or deferee sources, that is also a conscious and deliberated differential act, characterized by both the linguistic and epistemic differential operators; (3) unconscious deference by default to a previous conscious and deliberate deference to a source or sources when kind terms are used, characterized by the addition of a subindex D previous to the differential functor R of the operators; (4) LSAD deference to what is considered the kind term original deferee source or sources when the deferer defer to a mistaken source or mistaken sources, which is characterized by the operators marked with 'Ds' before the differential functor R; and (5) DTAD deference to what is considered the proper type of deference performed which is characterized by the operators marked with 'Ds' previous to the differential functor R.

Up to now, the way operators can work independently has been exposed. Now, let's introduce the way they can work together. As will be seen, the number of operators is exponentially higher according to how by default, LSAD and DTAD markers play for their possibilities by adding a viable operator in the conjunction. Thus, for sketching and synthesizing, we limit the number of samples to a conjunction of two deferential operators containing one source and two deferee (except for characterizing idiolects where the operators refer to the same deferee) and then set its version containing more than one deferee in both operators of the conjunction.

Let's start with the deferential linguistic operator in conjunction with Recanati's deferential operator to characterize deference to a language source and a representative of it and then to several language sources and representatives of them:

$$(29) R_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge R_x(\sigma)$$

$$(30) R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge R_{x1, x2, \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(31) DR_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge R_x(\sigma)$$

$$(32) DR_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge R_{x1, x2, \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(33) R_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge DR_x(\sigma)$$

$$(34) R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge DR_{x1, x2, \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(35) DR_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge DR_x(\sigma)$$

$$(36) DR_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge DR_{x1, x2, \dots}(\sigma)$$

Note that for conjoined Recanati's deferential operator, both LSAD and DTAD markers do not apply since those particulars can still be maintained while applying any of them to the linguistic or epistemic operator. Even if particulars were to be switched, to which ones they are going to be switched cannot be determined beforehand. Thus, for LSAD cases, we have the following:

$$(37) DsR_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge R_x(\sigma)$$

$$(38) DsR_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge R_{x1, x2, \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(39) DsDR_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge R_x(\sigma)$$

$$(40) DsDR_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge R_{x1, x2, \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(41) DsR_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge DR_x(\sigma)$$

$$(42) DsR_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge DR_{x1, x2, \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(43) DsDR_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge DR_x(\sigma)$$

$$(44) DsDR_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge DR_{x1, x2, \dots}(\sigma)$$

For DTAD cases, we have the following:

$$(45) \text{DtR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge R_x(\sigma)$$

$$(46) \text{DtR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge R_{x1, x2, \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(47) \text{DtDR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge R_x(\sigma)$$

$$(48) \text{DtDR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge R_{x1, x2, \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(49) \text{DR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DR}_x(\sigma)$$

$$(50) \text{DR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DR}_{x1, x2, \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(51) \text{DtDR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DR}_x(\sigma)$$

$$(52) \text{DtDR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DR}_{x1, x2, \dots}(\sigma)$$

Now let's advance to instances where both conjuncts involve linguistic deference and epistemic deference. For example, when there is deference to a language source and a related point of view about the natural/conventional kind term at hand:

$$(53) R_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge R_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(54) R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(55) \text{DR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge R_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(56) \text{DR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(57) R_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DR}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(58) R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DR}_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(59) \text{DR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DR}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(60) \text{DR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DR}_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

By setting up LSAD cases, we have the following:

$$(61) \text{DsR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge R_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(62) \text{DsR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(63) \text{DsDR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge R_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(64) \text{DsDR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(65) \text{DsR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DR}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(66) \text{DsR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DR}_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(67) \text{DsDR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DR}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(68) \text{DsDR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DR}_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

By setting up DTAD cases, we have the following:

$$(69) \text{DtR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge R_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(70) \text{DtR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(71) R_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DtR}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(72) R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DtR}_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(73) \text{DtR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DtR}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(74) \text{DtR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DtR}_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(75) \text{DtD}_{R_{ls[]}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{R}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(76) \text{DtD}_{R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{R}_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(77) \text{D}_{R_{ls[]}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{DtR}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(78) \text{D}_{R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{DtR}_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(79) \text{DtD}_{R_{ls[]}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{DtR}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(80) \text{DtD}_{R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{DtR}_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(81) \text{DtR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{D}_{R_{es[]}(\sigma)}$$

$$(82) \text{DtR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{D}_{R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)}$$

$$(83) \text{R}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DtD}_{R_{es[]}(\sigma)}$$

$$(84) \text{R}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DtD}_{R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)}$$

$$(85) \text{DtR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DtD}_{R_{es[]}(\sigma)}$$

$$(86) \text{DtR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DtD}_{R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)}$$

$$(87) \text{DtD}_{R_{ls[]}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{D}_{R_{es[]}(\sigma)}$$

$$(88) \text{DtD}_{R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{D}_{R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)}$$

$$(89) \text{D}_{R_{ls[]}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{DtD}_{R_{es[]}(\sigma)}$$

$$(90) \text{D}_{R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{DtD}_{R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)}$$

$$(91) \text{DtD}_{R_{ls[]}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{DtD}_{R_{es[]}(\sigma)}$$

$$(92) \text{DtD}_{R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{DtD}_{R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)}$$

By setting up LSAD and DTAD cases, we have the following:

$$(93) \text{DsR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DtR}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(94) \text{DsR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DtR}_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(95) \text{DsD}_{R_{ls[]}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{DtR}_{es[]}(\sigma)$$

$$(96) \text{DsD}_{R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{DtR}_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)$$

$$(97) \text{DsR}_{ls[]}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DtD}_{R_{es[]}(\sigma)}$$

$$(98) \text{DsR}_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma) \wedge \text{DtD}_{R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)}$$

$$(99) \text{DsD}_{R_{ls[]}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{DtD}_{R_{es[]}(\sigma)}$$

$$(100) \text{DsD}_{R_{ls1[], ls2[], \dots}(\sigma)} \wedge \text{DtD}_{R_{es1[], es2[], \dots}(\sigma)}$$

2.2.8. Multiple language sources and divisions of linguistic labor

Different language sources may imply different divisions of linguistic labor. However, when different subsets of users who establish norms of correct use (that structure various language sources) collaborate, a division of linguistic labor would be unified for structuring a one-way deferential chain for a kind term.

Though, as said in 2.2.6., when there is more than one subset of speakers who establish norms of correct use for a kind term whose impact is limited to a dialect or dialects, a sociolect or sociolects, a dialect-sociolect or dialects-sociolects, or transversal to them, kind terms users-deferers of such a term can face more than one language source. For facing more than one source when a kind term is used, the extensions of the term fixed by any of them must be shared.⁶⁵ So, when deferers face non-exclusive norms of correct use for a kind term, they can be linked or defer to more than one language source. However, difficulties arise in attributing to which sources they are deferring and linking them accurately to them. On the other hand, several language sources for a kind term lead the way to multiple-different-way directed attitudes in deferers.

Such language sources are technical sociolects, and as said, they can occur intra-communally, inter-communally, or both ways. They happen in an intra-communal way when more than one subset of speakers who acquire a kind term with practically the same extension is considered communally as legitimate language sources of it. On the other hand, they occur in an inter-communal way when different communities have each other at least one subset of speakers who acquire, apart from the other communities, a kind term with practically the same extension and who consider it to be the legitimate language source (whether or not they are aware of the other sources within other communities).

Now, a criterion for linking deferers to more than one language source of a kind term with practically the same extension could be the identification of their disposition to defer⁶⁶ to more than one of them. However, a kind term user can be unwittingly deferring to more than one source. For example, she can refuse that there is more than one source, be corrected, and still refuse she defer to more than one source. This is illustrated in cases of deference (in the sense of appealing to others when information from them is taken) to sources that deferers ignore are non-legitimate,⁶⁷ but assemble elements from more than one language source. Thus, though the criterion is very useful for linking, in many cases, deferers accurately to more than one source, a qualified look at the kind term use by the deferer would be necessary as a complementary criterion for linking them

⁶⁵ See footnote 63.

⁶⁶ We maintain the definition of deference as the attitude of both appealing to others' kind term's uses and allowing them to correct our uses.

⁶⁷ As cases of partial understanding of character, deception, self-deception, and so on.

properly. Therefore, LSAD criteria for linking deferers who ignore the original sources remain, only that accepting an ‘original source’ now can involve different language sources.

Additionally, deferers can be deferring linguistically/conceptually without any refusal, being aware that there is more than one language source of a kind term, and similarly deferring to legitimate sources for the communities they belong to but to the wrong ones.⁶⁸ Such sources can be those which share or do not share the same extension. However, in cases where more than one language source is involved,⁶⁹ deferers can defer to legitimate sources for communities they belong to or do not belong to, yet, to the wrong ones. On the other hand, when kind term users defer rightfully to more than one source which pertains to a community or more than one community,⁷⁰ they defer to several deferee sources in an intra-communal or inter-communal way, respectively.

That said, we call meanings/concepts of kind terms with practically the same extension, assembled from different semantic/conceptual deferee sources as *synthetic meanings/concepts*. As seen, those meanings/concepts can be assembled from different language sources located in the deferer’s communities or not. On the other hand, synthetic meanings/concepts of kind terms can be present within sources. Some cases can be seen in situations where they begin to be adopted and as conditions of meaning/concept change, so in such situations, they are conceived univocally. Other cases work as additional legitimated views on a matter within any language/conceptual source, so in such situations, they are conceived non-univocally. Meanings/concepts change can also happen on deferers part when they defer to more than one source and conceive them as synthetic meanings/concepts. Accordingly, in cases where more than one language source is involved, there are elements for accounting for meaning/concept change and can be the basis for developing an externalist account of meaning/concept change, i.e., a dynamic externalist approach.

Conclusions

Based on Stojanovic et al.’s view on deference by default, we state that deferer’s deliberate deferential attitude towards an established use is, at the outset, what supports it from then on for

⁶⁸ See also footnote 70.

⁶⁹ That is, when more than one language/conceptual source of a kind term with somehow the same extension is at hand.

⁷⁰ Whether they belong to the one or ones she pertains to, and even if each other recognizes the other ones as having legitimate language/conceptual sources.

attributing deference by default to her when no deliberated deference is operating. Contrarily to Stojanovic et al. (2005), we state that deference and partial understanding of a kind term use are concomitant issues at initial uses of it. In such situations, the kind term user cannot choose not to defer considering that she must be deferring for a minimal mastering of its use. Therefore, partial understanding is necessarily linked to deliberate deference in the preliminary stages of kind terms use.

Considering partial understanding of character as a case of partial understanding of meaning, we stated that in preliminary uses of a technical kind term where deferential concepts are undergoing (before any reference borrowing), a partial understanding of character must be concurrent to deference. Therefore, subsequent deference by default in the early stages of deference is also concurrent to it. Also, we maintained that epistemic deference operates deliberately and subsequently by default, implying that deliberate deference and deference by default are transversal to both linguistic and epistemic spheres of deference.

On the other hand, we stressed that misunderstanding the character of a technical kind term can take two forms. Firstly, within either the linguistic or the epistemic sphere and, secondly, between the linguistic and epistemic spheres. Also, we stated a form of deference by default that can be assigned when deferers defer to mistaken sources. For such deference by default to be operative, there is necessary that the deferer has conceived that kind term uses have an originally established use to which she intends to defer (an issue that also involves her thinking that she could be deferring mistakenly). We call such a kind of deference *language source assignation by default* (LSAD).

Additionally, in cases where linguistic and epistemic deference is switched by the deferers previous intention to defer to genuine sources and apprehension of correctability of the deferential act is contemplated, a by default assignation of the actual type of deference performed is allowed. In such cases, we have deferential types assigned by default (DTAD) at hand. Two cases of DTAD deference are considered: when (1) deferers assume their deference to opinions involving a kind term made by one or a group is its original meaning/concept, or when (2) identified original sources and their meanings/concepts are taken as if they have the nature of opinions.

Moreover, there are problems associated with Stojanovic et al.'s assumption that there is a *linguistic community* targeted by deliberate deference and deference by default. Firstly, they do not define 'the linguistic community.' Secondly, the term does not shed any light on the role expert sources play in it. They can be considered as sociolects or not, and there are no criteria for determining them. In this vein, it is important to note that many terms adopted by epistemic fields have different meanings/concepts than standard lexicons, leading to consider that they constitute sociolects parallel to the standard linguistic lexicons.

On the other hand, sociolects and dialects are the counterpart of a standard language and are not included within 'the linguistic community' according to Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), and Stojanovic et al. (2005). Unlike them, we state that there is more than a unique expert source for a kind term, even if we consider their view of the linguistic community.

Furthermore, to make the less large standardized and non-standard spheres of language operative, it is imperative to promote inclusive commitments when defining 'the linguistic community.' An inclusive approach has the advantage of eluding demarcation difficulties (as in the case of academic/scientific sociolects vs. standard lexicons) as far as the definition of 'language community' is concerned. By promoting an inclusive commitment in a definition of 'the linguistic community,' it is needed to emphasize language sources for deferential operations and to mark them according to defers' targets, i.e., if they are directed to users of a standard/not standard dialect and even to users of what is considered as the most extensive standard dialect. Therefore, equating 'the linguistic community' to 'the leading standard dialect' is avoided, and the inclusion of less extensive standardized and non-standard languages within a definition of 'linguistic community' is embraced.

Using deference to the linguistic community faces not only the problem of the indeterminacy of an expert source (where the meaning/concept of both the standard lexicon meaning and an epistemic field of the same term is faced) but a problem of self-referentiality since by its definition the deferrer is a part of it. Differently, using 'deference to a standard language,' where topics/kind terms' definitions of a knowledge field as deferential targets are considered instead of epistemic communities and their members, leads to the problem of explaining how deferers can always grasp

accurately standard meanings/concepts without the help of experts and by using their reflection powers.

The last problem is solved by considering epistemic communities and their members as the suitable way to reach kind terms' uses accurately. Hence, using deference to a standard language makes a category mistake since it mixes up character and content aspects of kind terms by considering kind terms' definitions of a knowledge field as deferential targets instead of epistemic communities, which are the appropriate means for accurately reaching them. Consequently, 'standard language' should be considered a topic/kind term of linguistics (in particular, sociolinguistics) with definitions that demand the guidance and clarity experts can offer.

According to our approach to deference to epistemic fields, a way out of the problem of the indeterminacy of an expert source is to circumscribe lexical information as a domain of a subfield of linguistics. This move goes from indeterminate sources to determined ones and guarantees a well-defined division of linguistic labor for lexical uses. Also, availability and distinction in the sphere of other disciplinary (epistemic field) use. In this vein, lexical linguistics becomes a source that captures different language sources by accurately allowing them.

Stating that deliberate deference and deference by default are transversal to linguistic and epistemic spheres of deference, and cases of partial understanding of the character of kind terms and both LSAD and DTAD, lead to deferential concomitances not envisaged by Stojanovic et al. Consequently, not only can be (linguistic) deferential concomitances, as in cases where deliberate deference and deference by default target a mistaken source and both LSAD and DTAD are operating but concomitances between linguistic and epistemic deference not considered. For example, when a mistaken type of deference is performed with epistemic deference, linked epistemic deference by default, can be operating along with DTAD. Also, when deliberate deference about a kind term is made linguistically and epistemically, epistemic deference by default works when deliberate linguistic deference is happening.

Considering our several distinctions of language sources (including more extensive standard dialects, standard dialects, non-standard dialects, sociolects, and technical sociolects) and their availability in a situation poses difficulties for determining the language source of a deferrer kind

term use, a usual way is appealing to lexical linguistics. Still, it is not ruled out that deferers can target community representatives or different technical sociolects. On the other hand, for LSAD cases, such a task can be accomplished by considering if the deferer is trying to use the term following such and such ordinary use of such and such dialect or such and such technical sociolect of such and such society. To determine the original source accurately, qualified assistance is necessary.

We characterize deferential operations by using Recanati's deferential operator or introducing changes to it to cover different types of deference and sources. Also, we consider characterizing deference to various deferee sources. Finally, we establish conjunctions of deferential operations where multiple deferential operations are characterized based on a modified Recanati's deferential operator that works as a main deferential operator of the conjunction and Recanati's deferential operator or another modified Recanati's deferential operator. We propose versions of the conjunctions where several deferee or deferee sources are covered.

On the other hand, for facing more than one source when a kind term is used, the extensions of the term fixed by any of them must be shared. In such situations, deferers face non-exclusive norms of correct use for a kind term and could be linked or defer to more than one language source. Accordingly, several language sources of a kind term lead the way to multiple-different-way directed attitudes in deferers. Additionally, we maintained that a criterion for linking deferers to more than one language source of a kind term with practically the same extension is, in part, their disposition to defer to more than one original source. However, a qualified look at the kind term use of the deferer would be necessary as a complementary criterion for linking them properly. Therefore, LSAD criteria for linking deferers who ignore the original sources remain, only that the acceptance of an 'original source' now could involve different language sources.

That said, we called meanings/concepts of kind terms with practically the same extension, assembled from different semantic/conceptual deferee sources as *synthetic meanings/concepts*. Those meanings/concepts can be assembled from various language sources located or not in the deferer's community. Additionally, kind terms' synthetic meanings/concepts can be present within language sources. Some cases can be seen in situations where they begin to be adopted and as conditions of meaning/concept change, so in such situations, they are conceived univocally. Other

cases work as additional legitimated views on a matter within any language/conceptual source, so in such situations, they are conceived non-univocally.

Meanings/concepts change can also happen on the deferers' part when they defer to more than one source and conceive them as synthetic meanings/concepts. Accordingly, in cases where more than one language source is involved, there are elements for accounting for meaning/concept change and can be the basis for developing an externalist account of meaning/concept change, i.e., a dynamic externalist approach.

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3. A Step Toward Dynamic Externalism

“...thought is rational only so far as it recommends itself to a possible future thought. Or in other words the rationality of thought lies in its reference to a possible future.” Ch. S. Peirce.

Abstract

Dynamic externalism is often assumed as an approach that explains the change in meanings. Though it is mentioned directly or indirectly in the literature (Alexandrov 2020, Burge 1986, Evans 1973, Kripke 1980) and Cappelen’s (2018) approach to Conceptual Engineering says it is based on it, it is still an unexplored area. However, it is unclear how his conceptual engineering project relates to and differs from it. This chapter elaborates on some relations and differences between Cappelen’s externalist conceptual engineering and dynamic externalism, focusing on levels and meta-levels in which they perform and relate. Also, it elaborates on an approach to dynamic externalism from the experts’ position based on elements mainly taken from Woodfield’s (2000) and Burge’s (1986) approaches. We conclude by setting an account of dynamic externalism focused on the relationship between identified synchronic and diachronic relations, a scheme of synchronic and temporal aspects of elements that mainly enable a gradual view of changes of kind term uses.

Keywords: Conceptual engineering, externalism, dynamic externalism, metasemantics, cognitive value, conventional kind terms, meaning change.

Conceptual framework keywords: Stand-by proposals, elapsed time, synchronic relations, diachronic relations, virtual content, diachronic contest, alternative standards.

Introduction

Cappelen (2018) appeals to semantic and social externalism as a theoretical basis for his theory of conceptual engineering. Though he points out limitations to those approaches as proposals that help in accounting conceptual change, it assumes that concomitant dynamic externalism plays an essential role. However, there needs to be more clarity on how it happens and in which ways

conceptual engineering relates to and differs from it. The chapter proposes ways to differentiate and relate dynamic externalism from conceptual engineering and elaborates on elements for formulating dynamic externalism based on experts.

In 3.1. and 3.2., we introduce Cappelen's externalist basis for his conceptual engineering framework. Those sections expose the distinction, on the one hand, between semantics and metasemantics, and on the other, between the metasemantic superstructure and metasemantic base. Also, elements such as intensions and extensions form an externalist approach where conceptual changes are said to apply are discussed. In 3.3., we discuss and problematize his view on dynamic externalism. In particular, we highlight differences between the sphere of dynamic externalism from the sphere of conceptual engineering.

In 3.4., we establish relations and differences between levels where metasemantics (including dynamic externalism) and conceptual engineering operate, emphasize temporal bounds, and draw conclusions. In 3.5.1., we elaborate on a scheme or model of dynamic externalism, highlighting two empirical criteria applied to meaning/concept change and related difficulties in obtaining consensus for an actual change in a knowledge field. In 3.5.2., we propose *stand-by proposals* as a solution to the consensus problem, taxonomy them, and define them synchronically and diachronically, even considering aspects of Jackman's (1999, 2005) and Thuns' (2020) future externalism. In 3.5.3., we elaborate on ideas regarding split situations and diachronic contests for stand-by proposals.

3.1. Cappelen's conceptual engineering: on metasemantics, metasemantic Superstructure, and metasemantic Base.

3.1.1. Semantics and metasemantics

Cappelen wants to show that conceptual engineering requires a metasemantic theory to change meanings. His approach will start with externalist assumptions he considers are correct and use them as foundations of his theory. He uses Kaplan's 1977, 1989 (quoted by Cappelen) definition of metasemantics, which states that it is a theory that provides explanations (foundations/groundings) of semantic facts (established expression's meanings and referents).

According to Cappelen, a conceptual engineering theory needs to introduce a metasemantic theory because it acts on facts that ground meaning. For changing meanings, the conceptual engineer must change the facts that ground them. In this order of ideas, he states that understanding conceptual engineering dynamic metasemantics is needed to explain how grounding facts change over time.

3.1.2. The metasemantic base and the metasemantic superstructure distinction

Cappelen distinguishes between the metasemantic base and the metasemantic superstructure. Cappelen considers that the grounding facts for meanings and reference constitute the metasemantic base. On the other hand, the metasemantic superstructure is constituted in part of attitudes (beliefs, hopes, preferences, intentions, theories⁷¹) about what meanings and reference are or ought to be.

He questions if the metasemantic superstructure affects the metasemantic base and if there is any discrepancy between both spheres. In this respect, he says:

what people say, think, propose, wish, and debate about meanings has very little influence on what words mean. The metasemantic superstructure has little effect on the metasemantic base and there can be a significant discrepancy between superstructure and base. This is not to say that meanings are unaffected by the superstructure. Our various mental states and beliefs have some effect on meaning, but in unpredictable ways (2018, p. 59).

Therefore, for Cappelen, the way to change meanings does not depend on changing people's attitudes about meanings. He considers it is necessary to go directly to the metasemantic base.

3.2. Externalist conceptual engineering

⁷¹ We are interpreting that Cappelen is talking about proto theories as soon as he is talking about what people with their inner cognitive powers consider *prima facie* about the meaning and reference of a term.

3.2.1. Intensions and extensions change

Cappelen presents a theory of conceptual engineering based on externalist tenets. In this way, conceptual engineering must work by changing intensions and extensions of expressions (which do not supervene only on our attitudes).

In this vein, for Cappelen, amelioration of a concept involves the extension and intension of a predicate changing over time. Still, changes in extensions are propelled/followed by changes in intensions. For Cappelen, changes in intensions that do not drive changes in extensions also are considered cases of reference shift.

3.2.2. Externalism

For Cappelen, semantic externalism is a metasemantic theory insofar as its main topic is to explain what makes it the case that expressions have the semantic values they have.

Cappelen list some of the assumptions he is going to take (assumed without argument) from metasemantic externalism:

(1) Putnam/Kripke/Burge/Williamson's metasemantic externalism: the external environment language users inhabit determines in part extensions and intensions. Intensions and extensions do not supervene only on their attitudes.

(2) The possibility of massive, fundamental mistakes and confusion about semantic values: wanting a thing to be in the extension of an expression doesn't make it the case.

(3) Anti-Creed: "A complex web of interactions and dependencies can hold a linguistic or conceptual practice together even in the absence of a common creed that all participants at all times are required to endorse" Williamson 2007, p. 125 (quoted by Cappelen).

3.2.3. How Reference change

According to Cappelen, the nature of externalist approaches makes it hard to explain reference change because their main aim is “to explain how extensions can be stable across individuals and over time despite differences in beliefs, use, dispositions to use, dispositions to infer, etc.” Cappelen (2018, p. 64). Thus, considering the nature of conceptual engineering is changing words and what they refer to, externalism is not a consistent approach to support it. However, Cappelen assumes that the possibility of reference change has been essential to them. Hence, he says, “my version of externalism is one that incorporates the constant possibility of reference change” Cappelen (2018, p. 64).

According to Cappelen, meaning-grounding facts for reference (non-psychological facts) might change over time. For him, some clues from some externalist approaches explain how reference change occurs: Evans’ dominant source information, Devitt’s related view, and Kripke’s intentions to preserve reference, which is overridden by intentions to refer to particular objects. Also, he mentions Dorr and Hawthorne’s (2014) argument from abundance. In such an argument, there are many possible meanings for an expression. Still, the selection as an expression’s actual meaning “depend very sensitively on the exact values of whatever microphysical parameters are relevant to the determination of meaning” Dorr and Hawthorne 2014, p. 282 (quoted by Cappelen). Cappelen considers that such a “rough picture can be endorsed without any commitment about the exact nature of the supervenience base for semantics” (Cappelen 2018, p. 66). Cappelen concludes that we do not understand how reference change happens.

In this order of ideas, he states that “there’s unlikely to be an algorithm for figuring out how these changes can be [e]ffected...if we’re looking for an algorithm for how to change meanings, we are in effect asking for a recipe for extracting meaning from use, and we have no good reason to think such a recipe exists” (Cappelen 2018, p. 67). Accordingly, there is no algorithm for deciding what it takes to be a dominant source in Evans’ approach or what is required for an override in intentions (to preserve or not to preserve a referent) in Kripke’s approach.

However, Cappelen states that we can be able to articulate an algorithm for how to change meanings. So, the aim is to provide a framework for those kinds of theorizing, which are seen as ameliorating terms. That said, in the last part of the section, Cappelen states that fundamental

features of externalist approaches⁷² do not add up to a recipe for reference change, “it doesn’t enable us to understand why each of the listed changes happened, why they happened the way they did, and why other changes didn’t happen” (2018, p. 68-9).

3.3. On Cappelen's reference change

According to Cappelen, “since the very beginning of the externalist tradition, the possibility of reference change (or shifts) has been an important element of such theories” (Cappelen 2018, p. 65). Though Cappelen discusses elements linked to reference change in Kripke, Evans, and others and states that his version of externalism “incorporates the constant possibility of reference change,” it is not clear that the topic of reference change has been an essential issue for the externalist tradition. On the contrary, one thing is that they are compatible with cases of reference change and that some have considered and accounted for some related elements that have to do with it. Another is that it is a crucial element for all the accounts. What is missing in the externalist tradition is an approach centered on explaining reference change, if you like, the development of a dynamic externalist theory.

Cappelen overlooks the last issue and is limited to concluding that reference change happens frequently but with a poor understanding of how it happens. Even he stresses that at the present stage of metasemantics, externalism’s tenets as baptismal events, division of linguistic labor, deference to experts, and expert’s views, do not contribute to a recipe for reference change. However, here there are at least three elements to consider. Firstly, one thing is a poor understanding of how reference change happens. Secondly, another different thing is to have a recipe for reference change. Finally, one thing is to consider externalist metasemantic tenets within *a stable approach on extensions across individuals and over time* (as he acknowledges) and another different how they can work in a dynamic approach across individuals and over time.

⁷² “[S]uch as introductory (baptismal) events, communicative chains, intentions to preserve reference in a chain, expert judgments and deference to experts, the speaker's environment, and complex patterns of use over time will” that affect semantic values (extensions and intensions in particular).

Let's elaborate on these three issues. Understanding how reference change happens and accounting for it is a matter of metasemantics and, particularly, of a dynamic metasemantics approach. Differently, having or developing a recipe for performing reference changes is a matter of conceptual engineering. So, one thing is setting an account of reference change, and another is the development of a formula for how to perform it. Cappelen states that conceptual engineering presupposes metasemantics, so it "in part shape your view on conceptual engineering" (Cappelen 2018, pp. 57 and 63). He adds that it is "a theory...in virtue of which meanings change and what those meanings are".

However, as we have stressed and Cappelen conversely suggests in his first statements, there is not a dynamic externalist metasemantics approach developed. Consequently, any of the listed fundamental features of externalists' approaches can't be seen as contributing to explaining *how reference change happens*.⁷³ In this vein, one thing is that externalism incorporates the possibility of reference change in the sense of foreseeing that changes in meanings are the case. Another is that they have established the conditions of how they happen. So, this explains in more detail why there is a poor understanding of how reference change happens.

On the other hand, in the case of Cappelen's non-detailed and fast treatment of metasemantics' and conceptual engineering levels when he is considering a recipe for reference change, we found that he first states that "there's unlikely to be an algorithm for figuring out how these changes can be [e]ffected" (quoted in section 3.2.3.). Such a statement can be read in two ways: firstly, that there has not been made a theory of how reference change, i.e., an externalist dynamic metasemantics, so there is no basis in which conceptual engineering can operate. Secondly, that there is unlikely the development of a theory of dynamic metasemantics for reference change in which conceptual engineering can operate. In any case, we can suppose that the first stage needed for effecting reference changes is a theory of reference change, i.e., a dynamic externalist account. Nonetheless, the statement can also be read as if there is no recipe for changing meanings instead of a recipe for explaining reference change.

⁷³ However, from a dynamic perspective, such issues could be seen as elements for explaining the change in meanings.

However, a few lines ahead by quoting Williamson's statement that there is no algorithm for calculating meaning from use, in the sense of the unlikeliness of the development of a theory of (dynamic) metasemantics for reference change, he states that "if we're looking for an algorithm for how to change meanings, we are in effect asking for a recipe for extracting meaning from use and we have no good reason to think such a recipe exists" (Cappelen 2018, p. 67). Thus, things seem to be getting clearer here. Asking for a recipe for extracting meaning from use appears to have no sense insofar as it is unlikely development of a theory of dynamic metasemantics. Therefore, neither does the development of an algorithm for how to change meanings, i.e., a theory of conceptual engineering.

However, Cappelen needs to clearly differentiate the level where dynamic metasemantics operates and the one where conceptual engineering works. This issue becomes more precise in the next section.

3.4. Metasemantics and conceptual engineering levels

Insofar as there is no significant elaboration on the relations and differences between dynamic metasemantics and conceptual engineering, in what follows, we state both and some consequences of them. So, let's begin by elaborating on the relations and differences between non-dynamic metasemantics and their dynamic counterpart.

Dynamic externalism as a meta-level of non-dynamic approaches. If dynamic externalist's rules are not located at the first level of metasemantics but at the second level metasemantics, i.e., it is based on non-dynamic externalism, the rules for how to change semantics –conceptual engineering– is a third-level theory. So, (1) the first-level reference change account is based on non-dynamic accounts, and (2) the rules for how to change semantics can also change, the metasemantics for whom first-level conceptual engineering is a topic is at the fourth-level metasemantics. However, dynamic externalism works as an advancement of its non-dynamic counterpart and not as a theory of it. If you like, the dynamic aspect of externalist theories is the completion of externalist theories and not a theory based on them. Thus, considering this issue,

let's state the relations and differences between metasemantics, including dynamic externalism and conceptual engineering.

Let's turn to the relations and differences between dynamic metasemantics and conceptual engineering. Classification and levels of two types of meta-theory: metasemantics levels and levels of conceptual engineering:

So, metasemantics level 1: explaining the rules of how semantics occurs, changes (in itself) and is redefined, i.e., establishing a metasemantics that involves dynamic metasemantics.⁷⁴

Meta-theory (level 2): (a meta-theory of metasemantics: Cappelen's conceptual engineering level 1): explaining the rules for *how to change the semantics*⁷⁵, i.e., establishing a meta-theory based on metasemantics level 1 account, i.e., explanations of rules of how semantics occurs, changes (in itself) and is redefined.

Metasemantics level 2 (meta-metasemantics): explaining the rules of how metasemantics (level 1) occurs, changes (in itself), and is redefined, i.e., establishing a meta-metasemantics that involves a dynamic meta-metasemantics.

Meta-theory (level 3): (meta-theory of meta-metasemantics: conceptual engineering level 2): explaining the rules for *how to change the metasemantics*, i.e., establishing a meta-theory of meta-metasemantics (a level 2 conceptual engineering) based on (I) metasemantics level 2, i.e., explanations of rules of how level 1 metasemantics occurs, changes (in itself) and is redefined, and (II) meta-theory level 2 account, i.e., explanations of rules for how to change semantics.

⁷⁴ This, considering that dynamic metasemantics can be seen as changes within the semantic approach itself and as an advance or redefinition, in Rorty's (1961) terms (quoted by Cappelen 2018, p. 69), and not as a meta-theory of its no dynamic counterpart.

⁷⁵ I am assuming here that the rules for how to change semantics are different from rules of how semantics occur and how semantics change, i.e., rules based on how semantics occur and how semantics change.

Metasemantics level 3 (meta-meta-metasemantics): explaining the rules of how level 2 metasemantics occurs, changes (in itself), and is redefined, i.e., establishing meta-meta-metasemantics that involves a dynamic meta-meta-metasemantics.

A lesson from previous classifications and levels is that the picture of conceptual engineering working as a meta-theory leads to conclude that the view of philosophy in Rorty's quotation (see footnote 74) is shortened and non-adequate to draw what it is trying to do Cappelen with conceptual engineering. Instead, such a view requires considering introducing advances made from a philosophical theory to another (if you like adding meta-theories that do not redefine theories before any process of theory redefinition)⁷⁶ to fit Cappelen's proposal in it.

Problem: how can conceptual engineering be a meta-theory of any level of dynamic metasemantics and be within them? Cappelen's levels of conceptual engineering are proposed as meta-theories of externalist metasemantics, but as is it a condition for semantics/metasemantics dynamics must be itself a target of its own study after venturing again as a meta-theory. So, in this case, levels 1 and 2 of conceptual engineering must be seen at least in two stages, in its beginnings, when conceptual engineering begins to make meta-theoretical proposals, and after them, when it performs semantic/metasemantic changes.

Thus, conceptual engineering is, in the beginning, a meta-theory that can be seen out of dynamic metasemantics levels. Still, at a point, it must consider its outcomes as a condition of semantic/metasemantic changes operating within it. Therefore, depending on its course of action, conceptual engineering can be seen as a meta-theory of any level of dynamic metasemantics that considers different elements and conditions for change in semantics/metasemantics or, in a second stage, can be seen as being a condition of change in semantics/metasemantics and as an object of different levels of dynamic metasemantics. Thus, it can also be seen in a third stage as a meta-theory that includes its outcomes in semantics/metasemantics as feedback and as an object of itself that helps to continue improving them.

⁷⁶ Insofar as Cappelen's conceptual engineering level 1 is not introducing new level 1 metasemantics (a theory of semantics).

So, let's ask at which level conceptual engineering is when it is an object of study. We can answer that insofar as it is at some stage a condition of semantic/metasemantic change, it is an object of study for it and performing at the semantics/metasemantics levels.

By definition, changes in semantics and metasemantics made by conceptual engineering cannot be made by it considered as a meta-theory. Likewise, it cannot be its object (as performer conditions for changes) when a metasemantics does not consider it as its object, and so by it as a meta-theory of it. Then, as a performer of conceptual changes, conceptual engineering can be inside or outside of metasemantics and, respectively, being considered or not by it. Thus, when inside, it can be regarded as an object but indirectly. Additionally, as a performer, conceptual engineering can take its previous performer outcomes as feedback.⁷⁷

Conclusion. There is no established dynamic metasemantics, but some advancements are in such a direction. Conceptual engineering based on externalist metasemantics needs the development of dynamic metasemantics that support it as a meta-theory and then as a change performer; or by being based on classic metasemantics and advances in dynamic externalism direction, conceptual engineering can be used to develop a dynamic metasemantics while directed to work as a performer of change.

Additionally, though one can pose the problem of an infinite regress, it is doubtful that it happens. Only a motive of too much scrutiny would lead the conceptual engineer (even a semantic meta-theorist) to propose the development of 4-level metasemantics and 4-level conceptual engineering to theorize over such research meta-levels. On the contrary, feedback between stages 1, 2, and 3 of conceptual engineering, including those of the lower levels to meta-levels, is likely to be enough information for working in ongoing conceptual engineering research. Scrutiny for developing 4-level meta-semantics and conceptual engineering is only functional in the long run research,⁷⁸ thus, will surpass the required times for ongoing practical research.

⁷⁷ We can ask if the experience at lower levels is helpful. However, we will skip this question because we need more elements to answer it.

⁷⁸ This is because, according to the times for ongoing research, it can luckily use enough information from a redefinition of both level-2 metasemantics and conceptual engineering groundings, for there is needed enough changes in metasemantics for changes in the next level to be consistently consolidated. So, it is less likely that there can be a

Thus, how much more it could make sense to appeal to levels of research on the change of the conceptual engineering interested in the foundations of metasemantics and conceptual engineering is level-3 metasemantics and level-3 conceptual engineering. This level, in both cases, could be for the interest of those focused on dynamics and conditions of change of theories of the theories in ongoing research. As said, appealing for a 4-level for both is plausible in a long-term conceptual engineering approach. In this way, additional meta-levels might not be helpful for conceptual engineering, even not likely to be developed in practice, at least not at short notice, making things more difficult for subsequent meta-levels.

3.5. Steps toward a Dynamic Externalism

In this section, like Cappelen (2018), we appeal to a view on conceptual engineering based on externalist theories of semantic contents but with some differences. We consider that *there is no developed until now a dynamic externalist approach for meanings/concepts*, so we state that it is necessary to sketch an initial version of it. In this vein, our approach starts conjecturing that meaning dynamics between experts is a metasemantic base for dynamic externalism. It is a version of Recanati's groundedness thesis,⁷⁹ but with the addition of dynamic aspects in it. To develop this approach, we focus on experts who subscribe to knowledge fields, not ordinary language users.⁸⁰

Thus, it identifies two processes involved in the semantic change from the expert's dynamics. One of those is said to structure meanings and is engaged in content generalization and preservation, while the other triggers the changes in the other. For grounding and developing the proposal, we take some elements and ideas extracted from different approaches which discuss directly or indirectly issues concerning dynamics where kind terms' meaning/concepts are at stake within an

well-established level-4 metasemantics and conceptual engineering from which to take information, for there is needed a progression of redefinitions of both level-3 metasemantics and conceptual engineering, which require a long time to consolidate.

⁷⁹ This is Recanati's (1997, 2000) original idea that deference must stop at a point. At such a point, someone does not defer to anyone and guarantees determined content for a term.

⁸⁰ A representative approach to ordinary language users is Burge's (1986) approach. As will be seen, such an approach helps model a dynamic externalist approach based on knowledge fields.

externalist framework. We mainly consider Woodfield's (2000) sketches on indeterminate deference between experts and his idea on better empirical criteria in methods for identifying samples for changing kind terms uses.

Since accepting such criteria depends on consensus, we appeal to additional elements considered by Burge's (1986) approach to changes in conventional meaning through cognitive values. Next, we propose stand-by proposals as a way out to the problem of consensus, take Jackman's (1999, 2005) temporal externalism view on meanings as a phenomenon that occurs through time (diachronic externalism) and Thuns' (2020) view on deference to ideal virtual speakers but instead appealing to what we consider are virtual deferers.⁸¹ In the end, we elaborate on elements for sketching criteria based on elapsed time, split situations, alternative standards, and diachronic contests between proposals.

3.5.1. Expert's deference and meaning/concept change

Let's suppose then that knowledge field experts are a fundamental component of the metasemantic base of an externalist approach on meanings/concepts for technical kind terms and consider how they can work in such a manner. Consider two of Woodfield's (2000) descriptions of experts' deference stated against Recanati's (1997) groundedness thesis, the idea according to which deference must stop at some time. Both descriptions have in common that criteria for deferring are grounded on empirical facts about the extension of kind terms (though, according to Woodfield, the issue can also be stated for their intensions, i.e., for stipulating an adequate construal of their sense).⁸² The first description is about a lineal deferential process where a layman defers to an expert to identify if a sample pertains to a kind term. However, the expert turns out to defer to another, and, finally, this last expert ends up deferring to another. The case is described as experts who are confident in another whose expertise area is supposed to have better criteria (the best judgment available at the time) on decisive issues on the matter at hand.

⁸¹ Virtual deferers can be seen as passive and active ones. Active deferers are the ones who defer with the intention to use a kind term in new and innovative ways. They are perhaps the main target when new technical/theoretical meanings are being developed.

⁸² The case considered is from linguistics. For example, when there is a continuous deference process, linguists defer to those who possess the best way to define a term.

The other description is about deferential processes that round circularly, though we have experts working in the same area in this case. *Better empirical criteria on methods for identifying samples considered as the referents of a kind term* are at play. At the same time, time elapses, so experts redirect their deference to the one they consider has the better criteria or not deferring when they succeed in having it. So, a kind term use is limited to its better application to its referents.

There is an important thing to consider about the second description. In such cases, deference occurs between experts of the same knowledge field (or same specialty). So, unlike in the first description, deference is about new elements that another expert of the same specialty relates to extensional aspects of a kind term. Could any meaning/concept change of the term be considered in such a deferential process? In the first approach to answer the question, our answer is yes since better empirical criteria on methods for identifying referents of a kind term can be considered as new information that relates intrinsically to it and which adds elements to its use (changing its intension without changing its extension). Thus, we can talk of meaning/conceptual change of a kind term in the sense of adding information for using it.

Additionally, since nothing prevents that meaning/concept change in the last sense described can lead to elements that can conflict with the ones already considered constitute the extension of the kind term, better empirical criteria on methods for identifying referents of a kind term can sometimes be regarded as a bridge which leads to changing meanings/concepts in the sense of changing a part of them or adding another or both. Accordingly, meaning/concept change can be seen as a result of new elements that relates intrinsically to a kind term in the sense of (1) changing related information of its use (changing its intension without changing its extension); (2) changing elements of its extension (without adding other elements); (3) adding other elements to its extension; or (4) changing and adding elements to its extension.

However, new empirical criteria on methods for identifying referents of a kind term can be stated by specialty experts without being adopted and deferred by the specialty community. Hence, for those criteria to be “better,” they must be approved by them. Likewise, since those criteria can lead to conflicting elements to the ones already possessed for using a kind term or the addition of others, or both, in such cases, there is also needed the approval of the expert community specialty for

changing or adding (or changing and adding) elements be assumed. Hence, a subsequent meaning/concept change happens. Thus, widening the information and use of a kind term and adding features to establish its extension (in this case, new samples considered referents of it) can also be recognized as conflicting elements to the established meanings/concepts. Since they are regarded as conditions that demand approval, they can be seen as challenging conditions to established meanings.

Accordingly, what other conditions must be achieved to demand a consensus in a knowledge field for changing meanings? As we will see, additional conditions must be achieved. Let's look for Burge's (1986) approach that considers other conditions for meaning/concept change in ordinary terms that fit well to our purposes.⁸³

Let's briefly expose Burge's (1986) approach to complement our answer.⁸⁴ Burge proposes a metasemantics account for empirically applicable ordinary terms based on the competence of users and the way they can influence others by implementing dialectics. He states (1986, p. 703) that few of the more competent users of a term can arrive at meaning-giving characterization of ordinary terms. Such normative characterizations for empirically applicable ordinary terms indicate facts that fix norms for identification and set norms for understanding linguistic conventions (meanings). According to Burge (1986, p. 706), the truth of normative characterizations for those terms lies in part in processes that involve reasons and the allusion of extralinguistic facts made by their more competent users. Particularly, such processes involve dialectics to explicate meanings by arriving at normative characterizations mainly by examples using archetypical indexical applications and synonymous expressions by the more competent users of the term. Though, in many cases the more competent users of a term reach an equilibrium in their normative characterizations (agreement), there is no guarantee of their truth.⁸⁵

⁸³ Burge recognizes that an analogy between empirically applicable ordinary terms and technical/theoretical ones for explaining meaning/concept change is, in many ways, equivalent (Cf. 1986, p. 716).

⁸⁴ We centered our discussion on conventional and lexical meanings instead of meanings linked to natural kinds. Thus, our reading on Burge takes a different course than Alexandrov's (2020).

⁸⁵ Though deference patterns from the more expert users are considered (Cf. Burge 1986, p. 703), there is no characterization.

Burge's approach states that both competent and non-competent users can doubt an established conventional meaning issue that can lead, in some circumstances, to challenge the consensus of the most competent speakers. In addition to doubt, new empirical facts and discernments for characterizing a term during the dialectic course can undermine the established normative characterization and change its meaning. Burge describes meaning change by introducing the relations between conventional meaning and cognitive value. Accordingly, a conventional meaning can say, for example, for 'sofa,' that sofa is a piece of furniture made for sitting. Corresponding cognitive values are the potential information from the perspective of the term users of the linguistic elements in the definition.⁸⁶ For example, 'piece of furniture made for sitting' and 'sofa' has different cognitive values insofar as doubts can be applied when both terms are equated in a definition other than in the identity judgment 'sofa is sofa.'

According to Burge (p. 714), during dialectic, when the conventional meaning of a term is characterized, meaning changes can happen when the discussion overflows the borders of the established norms. For example, one of the most competent users of the term can grasp both founded doubts about the conventional meaning of a term and relates to it a different cognitive value (a non-conventional theory of its use). If the new cognitive value (new discernment/insight, non-conventional theory) is supported by empirical facts (i.e., *newly identified applications of a term to empirical entities*), the established convention could be undermined and a new one established. From Burge's perspective, there is an open-ended character for changes in conventional meanings that results from a permanent prospect of changing them (the rise of cognitive values).⁸⁷ According to them, we have no other way than to individuate intentional mental states and events than by considering cognitive values since the decisive authority lies at

⁸⁶ Burge (1986, pp. 715-718) considers 'cognitive value' as a concept, a unit of potential information, and an explication of the cognitive perspective.

⁸⁷ Both elements are considered by Burge as intellectual norms involved in conventional meanings change. We can expand into both elements for discerning subsidiary norms: (1) the consideration that every conventional meaning is prone to doubts; (2) that doubts, when founded, challenge conventional meanings; (3) new supported ideas seen as a new way of considering the meaning of a term can change its conventional meaning. Additionally, an essential element considered by Burge mainly for maintaining conventional meanings and less for accounting for changes in them can be adapted: (4) for changing a conventional meaning there is also needed the employment of dialectics to show new meaning suitability (with the use of required examples) to the most competent users of a term.

the beginning in the established convention⁸⁸ or at the end in the new one which challenges the established convention.

Let's return to answering our question. Additional conditions for demanding a consensus for meaning/concept change can be found in exemplifying cases of subsidiary intellectual norms considered in footnote 87. Thus, doubts⁸⁹ and/or new insights (cognitive values/non-conventional theories) which are linked to new identification applications of a term to empirical entities plus the implementation of dialectics (from one of the most expert users of the term when undergoing doubts and/or insights) sum up additional challenging conditions to an established meaning/concept demanding a consensus for meaning/concept change of it.

Note that new methods for identifying referents of a kind term can lead to newly identified applications of that term to empirical entities, a situation that implies a change in the involved cognitive value and consequently a changing in its intension and extension as leaving behind past uses of the term. So, newly identified applications of the term to empirical entities involve its methods for identifying referents of a kind term which can derive in new identification conditions and perhaps to new identified applications of that term to empirical entities. However, newly identified applications of a kind term to empirical entities can occur without new methods for identifying referents of that kind term happening previously.

It is important to note also that new methods for identifying referents of a kind term can lead to a meaning change in the sense of a change of extension (points 2, 3, and 4 above) that is not strictly speaking a consequence of a cognitive value but a consequence of facing new elements serendipitously.⁹⁰ Hence, not every meaning/concept change in the sense of a change of extension

⁸⁸ Though fully understanding a cognitive value can be equated to the ideal understanding of conventional meaning, according to Burge (Cf. 1986, p. 718), their individuation is different. It is fundamental to consider that, in one case, we are considering elements that are fundamentally dependent on mental aspects. At the same time, on the other, they are dependent on mind aspects and their relations to several individuals.

⁸⁹ We want to say "founded doubts," but to be founded, they must be shown to be the case. Thus, we consider "founded doubts" those which have been agreed from involved expert parties during dialectics.

⁹⁰ One can ask if facing new elements serendipitously does not already involve a cognitive value. The answer is not, or at least not entirely. Peirce's semiotics helps answer such questions in this way. Considering that the relations between the object-sign, sign-sign, and interpretant-sign can undergo different stages, it allows the interpretant to be changing by her view on the object in different phases, so the expert's initial views on new elements in a serendipitous

can be seen as a result of the operation of cognitive values though they work after the conceived change.

Additionally, note that the envision of intellectual norms for meaning change (i.e., the permanent prospect of changing conventional meanings (the rise of cognitive meanings) and the subsequent open-ended character for changes in them) and stating challenging conditions (including those that can be derived from subsidiary intellectual norms) and ending with the implementation of dialectics for supporting any working challenging condition for meaning/concept change, must *strengthen a consummation of adherence/deference of experts* by persuading and even convincing colleagues. However, all these issues can be faced without a consensus for meaning change, adherence/deference, or both.

3.5.2. Stand-by proposals, consensus, and deference

There are several aspects to be considered for a consensus to be reached that even can sometimes escape the sphere of a discipline's epistemic values.⁹¹ Even appealing to the possibility of partial consensus or scattered/scarcely deference appears insufficient. Consequently, there do not seem to be sufficient conditions for a consensus for meaning/concept change. However, there is a possible way out of this problem, and one that makes room for proposals based on the established ones and perhaps possible advancements targeting meaning/concept change. There can be easily conceived proposals that, though are neither deferred nor accepted by an expert consensus, are not discarded. We label such phenomena as *stand-by proposals*.⁹² This approach allows us to state that even when no consensus (even partial or adherence, or both, in the sense of deference) is reached, there is room to stand and even advance alternative views.

way can be at the beginning understood as those which are limited to qualitative experiential aspects and even to those that initially links different sign-objects and sign-signs to it in a first stage (or initial stages) before a non-conventional theorist interpretant has arisen.

⁹¹ For example, internal/external coherence, explanatory power, explanatory economy, and innovation, among other epistemic values, can be obtained, but reticent behaviors among colleagues remain. Though many can be founded in relevant epistemic aspects that equate or surpasses many of the advantages of the new proposal and may prevent the adoption of a change, interests out of epistemic values can also be at stake (e.g., collective, political, or financial interests), even when their refusal to adopt the change is not well founded. Therefore, a complete consensus is a challenging task to obtain. As we will state below, a big problem for meaning change lies at the heart of the requirement for a quick change.

⁹² We focus on stand-by proposals whose referent is encompassed by a kind term. Think, for example, about the 'Newtonian universe,' 'dwarf planet,' 'Qualia,' 'subconscious mind,' etc.

Along these lines, the idea of a stand-by proposal is considered a phenomenon that allows for a proposal to be kept when a consensus or even adherence/deference to it is not reached. However, considering that the idea of a stand-by proposal involves an *elapsed time* in which many circumstances can change, including development in it, the idea of the stand-by proposal can be seen as one which works as a *promoter* whose target is to reach the status of a contender supported by others. This can be summed up as an additional condition for obtaining a consensus.

From the perspective of conceptual engineering discussed, stand-by proposals arise in contention to ones already established (they arise from terms that have fixed extensions), and *they are potentially a supported contender*. Stand-by proposals state two following scenarios. In the first scenario, different proposals on phenomena that share extensions (a current one and any which begins to be supported) or whose concerns are (presumably) about the same subject⁹³ become to coexist. The second scenario is the complete adoption of the new proposal while the other is left behind.

Considering that the first scenario can lead to the second one, let's look at involved elements in stand-by proposals and feasible involved elements in their potential transition into being supported by others.

⁹³ For our approach, cases that are essential to changing meanings/concepts in the sense of 'amelioration' are those which share extensions and subjects. Note that in these types of cases, meaning/concept change can involve changes in the subject, but not radical ones. Thus, if there is an alleged improvement in a meaning/concept, it has to do with fitness in the subject (that may also involve a change in it). In this fashion, we can have cases where the same subject involves different extensions (the Democritus-Thompson case, where 'atom' can refer to other things) or where the same extension involves a different subject (as in very different views and accounts on something, e.g., the meaning of water in some religious or indigenous groups involving mystic elements, and in scientific fields focused on pure descriptive elements, where meaning/concept diverge considerably). Accordingly, neither development in any of the sides for each type of case applies to the meaning/conceptual improvement of the other.

On the other hand, is 'amelioration' or 'improvement' of a concept/term the best way of talking about the aim of conceptual engineering? Instead of using valuative terms which can be dependent on issues lying outside the matter (as particular views or fashions) and considering that the valuative character of terms is relational in a comparative sense, we propose to use the 'derived fitness' of a concept/term instead of 'improvement' or 'amelioration,' or both, of a concept/term. The idea of using 'derived fitness' for kind term uses, in particular for new ones, has to do with two main things: (1) considering their empirical adequacy (as in both new methods for identification referents and new applications to empirical entities applied for kind terms use) and (2) considering their potentiality for being deferred/endorsed. Another problem we identify in using 'improvement' and 'amelioration' for new or engineered terms is the assumption that they are solved at the outset, which is *petitio principii* problematic, non-stepping, and even non-elaborated terms for conceptual engineering areas.

Let's begin with the early stages of stand-by proposals. We considered at least three scenarios that give them an aperture according to how their new proposed elements fit with facts. They can be: (a) a well-established contender not disposable but not adopted; (b) a plain contender not disposable but not adopted (c) not so well-established contender though not discarded and not adopted.⁹⁴ Elapsed time in the case of stand-by proposals is a factor to consider. In any case, a contender stand-by proposal can always be totally discarded or adopted (getting adepts, deferers, or supporters) in elapsed time by a knowledge field specialty depending on their developments, the established approach developments, or even the rise of new stand-by proposals (and their getting adepts and own developments).

The elapsed time of a stand-by proposal status brings into possibility its adoption as an alternative view to the established one. As a proposal, along with its aim of pursuing current expert adherence, there are developments and setting conditions for getting proximal future expert adherence (both future deferers, supporters, and consensus).⁹⁵ However, in many cases, there are no developments or settings for future expert adherence. Moreover, such settings do not guarantee to get future expert deference and support. Conversely, stand-by proposals status plus developments and settings targeting expert adherence can be considered as promoters of the expert deference and even of their willingness to contribute when their interest is awakened towards the issue.

Thus, Stand-by proposals characterize for instancing virtual content, a world-to-mind-fitness content in which virtual adherence (deferers, consensus, and support) is targeted. Thuns (2020) propose a similar idea with his 'teleological terms' (terms whose meaning is sensitive to epistemic respects). He appeals to a form of future externalism by adhering to elements in Peirce's idealized future experts and Jackman's (2005) future externalism, to undermine a form of *groundedness thesis* lying in those experts. However, Thuns' approach discards a Platonist view of groundedness thesis and appeals to one he labels as a *psycholinguistic hypothesis*. In it, many teleological terms

⁹⁴ For a proposal to obtain the status of a stand-by proposal, the fitness between the new proposed elements with empirical issues must match minimal requirements (for the discipline at hand) to be considered a 'not so well-established contender' while not being discarded from the beginning.

⁹⁵ We consider that a critical objective in stand-by proposals is their getting current adherence, but considering that they can be resetting and developing, their aim for getting deference and support can be expanded to proximal future developments and experts of the moment.

are non-determinate and not decisively established. On the contrary, “their boundaries evolve with our dealings with the world” Thuns (2020, p. 430). Accordingly, it is apparent that teleological terms possess the concrete content we generally grant them. Therefore, “only virtual semantic deference to future idealized linguistic collectives seems to be able to secure the intended semantic import for our teleological terms” Thuns (2020, p. 432).

Though we adhere to his idea of teleological terms, we do it with some differences. A difference has to do with term users. We limit teleological uses to experts.⁹⁶ However, the main difference lies in the given scope to them. We are reluctant to adhere to Jackman’s (1999, 2005) future externalism.⁹⁷ So, while we appeal to future proximal uses and conceive grades of determination

⁹⁶ Though Thuns (based on Jackman) differentiates pragmatic uses from epistemic uses (in our terms, lexical and technical uses), the relations between the two need to be better established. In his example of big fishes considered whales by fishermen, it is an illusion that their pragmatic uses end up meaning that their extension is different. Pragmatic uses are not teleological. However, pragmatic/lexical uses do not exclude deference to technical uses. Though ‘reptile’ in lexical semantics does not include ‘birds,’ it does not exclude deference to the new cladistic use of biological taxonomies. Even if there is something as natural kinds, their truth values are determined, changing their content. In this vein, as deference bridges the gap between different term uses, synchronic relations between meanings should be considered. As the whale-big fish example is considered diachronically, we can grant that Thuns argument follows. A similar approach based on diachronic relations, only this time against synchronic externalism, is that of Ebbs (2000). However, not differencing the boundaries and relationships between lexical and technical usages led him to some problems. His approach to practical judgments about extensions across time fails to show that they undermine synchronic externalism accounts on extension fixations across time insofar as the example of ‘gold’ used in his initial and main thought experiment relates to the lexical sphere of language.

Contrary to competition with expert extension fixations, lexical sphere fixations run parallel to them. Ebbs needs to expose an account of how reference is fixed and states that he is not interested in such an approach. However, one can appeal to the descriptive approach to linguistics to explain in the sense of Williamsons’ ‘anti-creed’ (in Cappelen 2018, p. 63) thesis to maintain parallel spheres of language use and reference fixation between a lexical sphere and expert sphere. As said, branching examples of different ways of developing language use aiming to undermine synchronic externalism’s exclusive objective use must be proposed by considering expert cases both with natural and conventional kind terms.

The issue that the lexical sphere conflicts with synchronic externalism is initially stated in the following passage: “I will argue that just as we reject individualism because it conflicts with our practical judgments of sameness of extension at a given time, so we should reject (M) because it conflicts with our practical judgments of sameness of extension across time” (Ebbs 2000, p. 247). This conclusion is problematic insofar as Ebbs did not show with his thought experiment 1 that in the counterfactual community, the practical judgments are fundamentally different from those of experts, so there is not such a conflict for M. As said, there is only one difference: to name platinum as ‘gold,’ i.e., we can say ‘gold 2’. So, in the end, there is not a significant change in meanings, and one can conclude that gold 1 (AU 79), as involved in both scenarios, is what was said across time. Additionally, there is a category mistake when one tries to use a lexical sphere of meaning to undermine a different sphere of meaning. We can conclude that thought experiment 1 can be helpful to show the opposite: that in branching situations as those described in it (where at a time *t* there can be a scenario with a different (and even concomitant) development of events), there is a case of sameness of extension across time, i.e., the preserved extension in both scenarios. The same strategy, thus, can be used for lexical terms to show sameness of extension across time for non-relativist scenarios in such a sphere.

⁹⁷ We accept that language develops in time and should be addressed from a diachronic perspective. However, the idea of a future that determines present uses is not exempt from paradoxes. Temporal/diachronic/future externalism

from present to future (so deny any determination from the future to present uses), Thuns is viewing distal future uses and their virtual influence on present ones. Therefore, we support an inverse view of his psycholinguistic hypothesis, one which explains stability in meanings/concepts from social settings views, not from the future to the present but from the past, going through changes in the present and proposals from the present expecting to change elements in the (proximal) future. Thus, no future elements nor virtual expectations are regarded as things that stabilize current meaning/concepts. On the contrary, virtual content in teleological terms is seen as a force tending to stabilize proposed changes in meanings/concepts.

Now, back to stand-by proposals, when a stand-by proposal is stuck with no adepts, one must ask how a colleague's deference can be obtained and their interest in contributing to it. As said above, settings and developments in it are not a guarantee. What other elements can help tip the balance to deference and interest to contribute? Within epistemic fields, interest in a subject has linkages with constant demands on generating new knowledge and innovation. With the continuous changes in social views⁹⁸, there can be adduced that stating novelty in a proposal is a condition for rising interest in it. The rise in interest in a proposal due to novelty in new empirically adequate proposals⁹⁹ depends on their warrant of fitness with the subject.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, epistemic values such as fitness with the subject and originality in it beyond rising deference can raise interest in contributing to it.

paradox: future term uses determine/affect our current uses of the same term (shared reference and equilibrium of uses), but future uses are indeterminate insofar as (1) they could or couldn't happen, (2) the way they happen can be one or another, and (3) they can be developed in a wrong or inaccurate way. Thus, according to future externalism, *a thing that is indeterminate to happen determines present uses*. On the other hand, synchronic externalism (presentism) relates current uses of terms to other present uses of the same terms in the sense that the first ones are determined/affected by the second ones. In this case, things that are determined determine/affect other things, i.e., term uses, which are determined by a subset of people in the present, determine/affect other people's uses of the same terms. In this vein, diachronic/future externalism is not, in its conceptual structure, analogous to synchronic/present externalism. Therefore, there are no good reasons to state, as Jackman (1999, 2005) does, that if one accepts synchronic externalism tenets, nothing prevents her from doing so with diachronic/future externalism.

⁹⁸ Many aspects of societies' views bound and influence the scope of proposals. Consider, for example, moral and ethical aspects.

⁹⁹ I.e., when new methods for identifying referents and cases where the identification of new applications to empirical entities are both applied using kind terms.

¹⁰⁰ Note that fitness with the subject of kind terms, though depends on empirically adequate matters, depends mainly on the aims for using them. Such aims allow for understanding the contribution of the new empirical adequacy. See the discussion below.

Now, the question is how to guarantee both last issues. The new proposal's empirical adequacy must have roots in the subject to be acknowledged as working as a continuation. The issue is easily conceived in cases where new methods for identifying referents of a kind term are happening since the overall subject is maintained. Only new techniques for identifying such referents are added. What about cases where new applications to empirical entities for a kind term are identified? Empirical adequacy in such instances has roots in the subject when the new use of a kind term shares the extension of the already established use, and there are linkages between such sharing and its aims for using it are similar or no distant to those that build up the already established use.¹⁰¹ Insofar as in such cases, the use of the kind term and, consequently, its subject undergoes changes without changing its overall features while others are added, there can be said that a new subtype kind term and the subject are at stake. So, if empirical adequacy is guaranteed for a new use of a kind term, both its subject remains, and its novelty in the area comes on top of that.¹⁰² Therefore, in cases like those mentioned, we can talk about buildups and contributions to the subject and the area.

3.5.3. Two types of dynamics in meaning/concept change

When empirically adequate, new uses of stand-by proposals of a kind term open the way in elapsed times to adherence in the form of deference and consensus. Previous to any rising interest in contributing to the proposal, such elapsed times can happen while two related and differentiated processes are at stake.

Deference dynamics between same area experts involve at least two differentiated processes, one in which a proposal is developed until its release and another in which released proposals lie and are related to each other. The first one is characterized by being a triggering condition for changes in the second process and for undergoing changes faster. The second one is characterized as the

¹⁰¹ E.g., the aims for using 'water' as "the spirit of the mountain" are distant from those for descriptively using 'water' by chemistry as in "a substance composed by molecules which in turn are composed by such and such particles, and with such and such properties," and so on. Or, at the same glance, considering 'water' from the perspective of Ecology as a factor that in such and such conditions is crucial for life/niche maintenance.

¹⁰² Adherence to new uses of a term does not imply that a knowledge field discards its already established use. Considering the linkages it has established, it is likely that the new proposal augments elements in the area, competes for the fittest place in the discipline, or both, by stating its further adjustments. This issue involves that the new proposals work as buildups, in parallel, or in both ways, to the established ones.

formal released (stand-by) proposal that begins to contend established uses either as being claimed to be an advancement, an alternative, or its successor.

In any instance of the two processes, adherence can happen. The idea of elapsed time helps explain meaning/concept change and depict the structure of dynamic externalism. *Elapsed time opens the way to adherence and split situations, which lead to establishing branches by becoming established or replacing established uses.* In this sense, when people use a kind term deferentially while there is more than one accepted use for it (in the sense of adherence by some experts but where there is not an overall consensus for their acceptance), a suitable synchronic relation from the plurality can be determined for identifying its meaning/concept by linking their use/content to the standard use¹⁰³ (as classic externalist approaches do) or by appealing to the convergence of both extensions and aims for which accepted proposals are meant to be used.

In any case, meanings/concepts in a synchronic externalist framework as the one considered are not exclusive and univocal.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the knowledge field's expert deferrers are more properly allowed to determine their target (to which proposal they are deferring), an element involved in stand-by proposals' elapsed time that allows for the conformation of early support (elapsed time for conforming early diachronic resets, i.e., new synchronic relations¹⁰⁵)—considering the potentiality of any endorsement to establish deferential chains or to minimally establish links to users of kind terms (minimal passive synchronic relations). In this vein, if it is stipulated that early supporters change the status of a stand-by proposal for using a kind term from 'stand-by proposal' to a 'somehow established proposal,' subsequent diachronic resets (the elapsed time for following changes in synchronic relations) can be considered as affecting the use of an established proposal.

However, the time point for determining if a proposal is established within a knowledge field goes beyond the establishment of early deferential chains, involving a consensus for it as a use of the knowledge field, though not wholly accepted as the main accepted proposal for mainly using it. Consequently, externalist synchronicities must be differentiated from standards of use. In any case,

¹⁰³ I.e., to the generally accepted use by the knowledge field.

¹⁰⁴ Univocality in meanings/concepts according to the two related processes mentioned.

¹⁰⁵ For example, using language source assignation by default (LSAD), see chapter 2, section 2.2.2. and, especially, 2.2.6.

standardization which is a consequence of technical consensual use is what effectuates the establishment of a proposal within a knowledge field. The idea of externalists' synchronicities (differentiated from consensual standardization) compels to distinguish *two types of stand-by proposals*, those which have not undergone any endorsement and those which have endorsement but where there is no consensus about their status in a knowledge field.

Still, some experts can technically establish standard uses in a split situation where there is not an entire consensus within a knowledge field. In such cases, we talk about *alternative standards*. Both stand-by proposals and alternative standards develop in a *diachronic contest*. A diachronic contest is an elapsed time where an established proposal undergoes tensions by being challenged by a new proposal which can be initially a stand-by proposal without endorsement but can also change to be endorsed (stand-by proposals accepted) and then to be alternatively standardized. In this vein, an entire standardization is a point (if no other stand-by proposal begins another diachronic contest) where finish a diachronic contest for a kind term use.

Such an elapsed time also opens the way to subsequent endorsements (elapsed time for a subsequent switch to a different synchronic relation (a subsequent diachronic reset)). This last issue allows stand-by proposals to get adherence and to become established each time as a more fitted kind (or sub-kind) term. Yet, for every contribution (new related proposal), new resets can happen while new sub-kind terms are proposed. Changing meanings (by adding and replacing elements) involves adding subtypes and discarding others. Does this mean that meaning is changed without changing the subject? At the time, it could be identified as composed of heterogeneous elements between those which are preserved and those which are introduced.

Conclusions

Cappelen's approach to conceptual engineering does not distinguish dynamic metasemantics and conceptual engineering levels of operation. Different from him, we stated that there is no established dynamic metasemantics, but some advancements are in such a direction. Also, conceptual engineering based on externalist metasemantics needs the development of dynamic metasemantics that support it as a meta-theory and then as a change performer; or by being based

on classic metasemantics and advances in dynamic externalism direction, conceptual engineering can be used to develop a dynamic metasemantics while directed to work as a performer of change.

On the other hand, considering levels of conceptual engineering, feedback between level stages 1, 2, and 3, including those of the lower levels to meta-levels, is likely enough information for working in ongoing conceptual engineering research. However, the above levels lack practicality at short notice research; thus, developing 4-level meta-semantics and conceptual engineering is only functional in the long run research.

Better empirical criteria on methods for identifying referents of a kind term can be considered as new information that relates intrinsically to a technical kind term use, thus changing elements to its use (changing its intension without changing its extension).

Since nothing prevents that meaning/concept change in the last sense described can lead to elements that can conflict with the ones already considered to constitute the extension of the kind term, improved empirical criteria on methods for identifying referents of a kind term can sometimes be regarded as a bridge which leads to changing meanings/concepts in the sense of changing a part of them or adding another, or both. Accordingly, meaning/concept change can be seen as a result of new elements that relates intrinsically to a kind term in the sense of (1) changing related information of its use (changing its intension without changing its extension); (2) changing elements of its extension without adding other elements; (3) adding other elements to its extension; or (4) changing and adding elements to its extension.

Specialty experts can state new empirical criteria on methods for identifying referents of a kind term without being adopted and deferred by the specialty community. Hence, for those criteria to be “better” when applied to a kind term, they must be approved. Since they are regarded as conditions that demand approval, they can be seen as challenging conditions to established meanings. Therefore, they can be considered as conditions that demand a consensus for meaning/concept change.

Additional conditions for demanding a consensus for meaning/concept change can be found in exemplifying cases of Burge's subsidiary intellectual norms. Thus, doubts or new insights (cognitive values/non-conventional theories), or both, which are linked to new identification applications of a term to empirical entities plus the implementation of dialectics (from one of the most expert users of the term when undergoing doubts or insights, or both) sum up additional challenging conditions to an established meaning/concept demanding a consensus for meaning/concept change of it.

For tiring up the balance to contribute in a subject, by considering the continuous changes in social views, there can be adduced that stating novelty in a proposal is a condition for rising interest in it. The rise in interest in a proposal due to originality in new empirically adequate proposals depends on their warrant of fitness with the subject. Therefore, epistemic values such as fitness with the subject and novelty in it beyond rising deference can raise interest in contributing to it.

To guarantee fitness with the subject and its novelty in it, the new proposal's empirical adequacy must have roots in the subject to be acknowledged as working as a continuation. The issue is easily conceived in cases where new methods for identifying referents of a kind term are happening since the overall subject is maintained. Only new techniques for identifying such referents are added. In cases where new applications to empirical entities for a kind term are identified, empirical adequacy in such instances has roots in the subject when the new use of a kind term shares the extension of the already established use and there are linkages between such sharing and its aims for using it are similar or no distant to those that build up the already established use. Insofar as in such cases, the use of the kind term and, consequently, its subject undergoes changes without changing its overall features while others are added, there can be said that a new subtype kind term and the subject are at stake. So, if empirical adequacy is guaranteed for a new use of a kind term, both its subject remains, and its novelty in the area comes on top of that. Therefore, in cases like those mentioned, we can talk about buildups and contributions to the subject and its area. Also, there is no complete change in the subject.

However, the listed conditions demanding a consensus can be obtained, and still, no consensus for a meaning change is obtained. This is because there are not sufficient conditions for a consensus

for meaning/concept change. A possible way out of this problem, and one that makes room for proposals based on the established ones and perhaps possible advancements targeting meaning/concept change, are *stand-by proposals*. They are proposals that are neither deferred nor accepted by an expert consensus. However, they are not discarded. Stand-by proposals happen when no consensus (even partial or adherence, or both, in the sense of deference) is reached; there is room to stand and even advance alternative views.

A key element in stand-by proposals is *elapsed time* in which many circumstances can change, including development in it. Involved elapsed time brings the way to see them as promoters whose target is to reach the status of a contender supported by others (an issue that can be summed up as an additional condition for obtaining a consensus). In this way, they have potentially supported contenders. From experts' perspectives, technical terms are used in a teleological way. This means they possess virtual content in which world-to-mind-fitness content in which virtual adherence (deferers, consensus, and support) is targeted. Virtual content, in teleological terms, is seen as a force tending to stabilize changes in meanings/concepts.

We adduce that stating novelty in a proposal is a condition for rising interest in it. The rise in interest in a proposal due to novelty in new empirically adequate proposals depends on their warrant of fitness with the subject. Therefore, epistemic values such as *fitness with the subject and novelty in it* beyond rising deference can raise interest in contributing to it. To guarantee both issues, working as a continuation must guarantee that changes in the subject do not involve an overall change. In such cases, we can talk about buildups and contributions to the subject and the area. Therefore, both its subject remains, and its novelty in the area comes on top of that.

The last section brings elements to set advancements into dynamic externalism. First, it differentiates two dynamics in the establishment of proposals. We adduce that established proposals are the ones that are profiled for adherence and grades of consensus. Thus, according to their stability profile, they are the opportune elements for grounding meanings and contents.

For setting dynamic externalism, diachronic elements must be considered in a synchronic account of meanings/concepts, i.e., explaining step-by-step synchronic changes by considering relevant elements when both relations are related. In this vein, the elapsed time is crucial for depicting

meaning/concept change. It allows explaining adherence and split situations where changes between established uses and stand-by proposals occur, and branches become operative. Diachronic adherence helps to explain the establishment of new synchronic relations between passive relations and deferential chains (where stand-by proposals change to somehow established proposals and affect the use of an established proposal).

Externalist synchronicities are differentiated from standards of use based on the required times for their establishment. Thus, some related issues are considered: (1) the endorsement of a stand-by proposal without consensus about its condition remains the same status as a stand-by proposal. (2) A diachronic contest between established and stand-by proposals develops in an elapsed time where stand-by proposals can become endorsed and subsequently standardized. (3) A diachronic contest can be extended with additional proposals if the established proposal still is endorsed but not the standard use. (4) In a diachronic contest, synchronic relations (passive and structured ones) are dynamized by adding and subtracting them and followers to any proposal. (5) Endorsements led to alternative establishments, sub-kinds parallel uses composed of heterogeneous elements between those which are conserved and those which are introduced.

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