Examinando por Materia "Succession"

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    La causalidad desde Hume a Kant : de la disolución absoluta del concepto a su constitución como Ley.
    (2015-06-25) Ponce Andaur, Arnaldo; Muñoz Valdés, Héctor
    En el presente artículo exponemos las reflexiones desarrolladas por Kant y Hume sobre la filosofía (metafísica) de la causalidad, sin insistir en los aspectos problemáticos de aquella comparación. Más bien se señala que ambas filosofías desarrollan extremos diferentes de un único a priori. No tomaremos en cuenta, para empezar, la terminología comúnmente aceptada: la contraposición entre racionalismo y empirismo. Por el contrario, no dando por establecidas caracterizaciones generales, exponemos idea tras idea en su significado inmediato. No obstante, se verá que la perspectiva de Hume se acerca a la perspectiva trascendental; y no intentaremos evaluar la filosofía de Kant desde el punto de vista psicológico de la causalidad, que supuestamente es decisivo en Hume. Abstract In the present article, we expose the reflections developed by Kant and Hume on the (metaphysical) philosophy of the causality without insisting in the problematical aspects of that comparison. Rather it is indicated that both philosophies develop different extremes of one a priori. We will not take into account, to begin with, the terminology commonly accepted: The contraposition between rationalism and empiricism. On the contrary, no taking for established general characterizations, we expose idea after idea in its immediate significance. Nevertheless, it will be seen that Hume’s perspective approaches to the transcendental perspective; and we will not try to evaluate Kant’s philosophy from the psychological point of view of the causality, that supposedly is decisive in Hume.
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    La Philosophie A-T-Elle Un Christ ? Problemes Relatifs A L’histoire Deleuzienne De La Philosophie.
    (2015-06-25) Cherniavsky, Axel
    Si, contre la conception hégélienne de l’histoire de la philosophie comme succession de systèmes, Deleuze et Guattari proposent l’idée d’une coexistence de plans, c’est pour éviter de penser la relation entre les philosophies comme opposition, réfutation ou dépassement, pour construire un cadre à partir duquel apprécier la singularité de chaque philosophie. Alors pourquoi proclament-ils ensuite Spinoza « le Christ des philosophes » ? Et l’idée même d’une coexistence de plans, d’une coexistence des grands philosophes, des véritables créateurs de concepts, ne suppose-t-elle pas elle aussi une sélection, la constitution d’un panthéon philosophique ? La relation entre l’histoire de la philosophie hégélienne et la deleuzienne se révélera beaucoup plus complexe qu’une opposition. De fait, il est possible de repérer différents modèles historiographiques dans l’oeuvre de Deleuze, de même que dans celle de Hegel. Par conséquent, on verra osciller la place du second par rapport au premier selon l’histoire qu’on prendra comme cadre de référence. Summary Against the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy as a succession of systems, Deleuze and Guattari suggest the idea of a coexistence of planes. That is because they are trying to avoid thinking the relation between the philosophies as an opposition, a refutation or a sublation, in order to build a frame which allows them appreciate the singularity of each philosophy. So why is it that afterwards they proclaim Spinoza “the Christ of philosophers”? Even the idea of a coexistence of planes, a coexistence of great philosophers, of true creators of concepts, does not suppose as well a selection, the constitution of a philosophic pantheon? The relation between the Hegelian and the Deleuzian history of philosophy will turn out to be much more complex than an opposition. In fact, it is possible to locate different historiographical models in Deleuze’s works, as well as in Hegel’s. Therefore, we will see the latter fluctuate in relation to the former depending on which historiographical model we take as a frame of reference.