Examinando por Materia "Hábito"

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    Efectividad de la rejilla palatina en el tratamiento del hábito de succión digital en niños.
    (2014-01-27) Villavicencio Flórez, Judy Elena; Hernández Silva, Jesús Alberto
    Se realizó un análisis retrospectivo en 75 niños (as) con edades entre 4 y 10 años que consultaron por tener persistencia de hábito de succión digital, y se trataron con la instalación de la rejilla palatina. De ellos 33 (44%) se encontraban en dentición temporal y 42 (56%) en dentición mixta. Suspendieron el hábito con la terapia 63 (84%) pacientes, 28 del grupo con dentición temporal (85%) y 35 (83%) del grupo con dentición mixta. Los resultados favorables se obtuvieron durante el primer mes de instalación de la rejilla. La rejilla palatina fija se constituye en una excelente ayuda para el tratamiento de hábitos de succión persistentes pues tiene un éxito de tratamiento por encima de 80%. La terapia llevada a cabo en este estudio demostró ser efectiva en pacientes en dentición decidua y mixta. A retrospective analysis was performed on 75 children aged 4 to 10 years old who consulted for persistent digital sucking habit. They were treated by means of a palatal crib; 33 (44%) children had deciduous dentition and 42 (56%) mixed dentition; 63 (84%) patients eliminated the habit with the therapy, 28 (85%) with deciduous dentition and 35 (83%) with mixed dentition The favorable results were obtained during the fist month of the palatal crib use. Palatal crib is an excellent help for persistent digital sucking habits with a successful treatment over 80%. The therapy carried on in this paper had effectiveness in patients with deciduous and mixed dentition.
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    PublicaciónAcceso abierto
    Practical Reason, Habit, and Care in Aristotle
    (Universidad del Valle, 2016-10-18) Bermúdez, Juan Pablo
    (Eng) Interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of action in the last few decades has tended toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by the revival of anti-intellectualism (particularly from J. Moss’ work), according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. In this essay I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and propose an intermediate account, which I call indirect intellectualism, that preserves the merits of both traditional interpretations and is able to dispel the problems that trouble each. There is very strong textual evidence for the claim that goal-setting is the task not of reason but of character (and in this anti-intellectualists are right); but reason is able to set goals indirectly by carefully shaping the processes of habituation that constitute a person’s character (and in this intellectualists are right). I argue for this position through a study of the division of labour between character and reason, and through a reconstruction of Aristotle’s conception of habituation.